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Betting on Climate Policy:
Using Prediction Markets to Address
Global Warming
Gary M. Lucas, Jr.,†* and Felix Mormann**
Global warming, sea level rise, and extreme weather events have made
climate change a top priority for policymakers across the globe. But which
policies are best suited to tackle the enormous challenges presented by our
changing climate? This Article proposes that policymakers turn to
prediction markets to answer that crucial question. Prediction markets
have a strong track record of outperforming other forecasting mechanisms
across a wide range of contexts — from predicting election outcomes and
economic trends to guessing Oscar winners. In the context of climate
change, market participants could, for example, bet on important climate
outcomes conditioned on the adoption of particular policies. These
prediction markets would aggregate policy-relevant information from a
variety of sources to improve upon existing decision-making methods,
including expert deliberation, peer review, and cost-benefit analysis.
Prediction markets also have the potential to overcome resistance to
climate change mitigation efforts, particularly among market-oriented
conservatives. We explain how both the federal and state governments
could use prediction markets to help resolve high-profile controversies,
such as how best to allocate subsidies to promote clean technology
innovation and which policy strategy promises the greatest reduction in
carbon emissions.
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INTRODUCTION
The question of how to address climate change is a difficult one.
Most experts agree that the United States should use a carbon tax or
cap-and-trade program to place a price on the carbon emissions that
drive global warming.1 In the short term, however, pricing carbon may
be politically impossible due to resistance from industry, voters, and
conservative politicians.2 As a result, some argue for second-best
policies that are less ambitious, but more politically palatable,3 such as
federal fuel-efficiency standards for automobile manufacturers and
state-level renewable portfolio standards for electric utilities. Skeptics,
however, maintain that a second-best policy strategy will cost too
much and likely prove ineffective.4
Even if pricing carbon were to become politically feasible,
complementary policies might still be needed to effectively mitigate
climate change. In particular, some experts argue that the government
should heavily subsidize innovation in clean technologies to facilitate
an economy-wide shift away from fossil fuels and toward renewable
sources of energy.5 Skeptics, however, cite to past failures and claim
that politicians would use these “green subsidies” to reward favored
special interests rather than to benefit the environment.6
1 See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN
REVIEW xviii (2007) (explaining that taxing carbon is an effective economic solution to
excessive carbon emissions); Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures:
Technology and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165, 169 (2005); cf.
Atanas Kolev & Armin Riess, Environmental and Technology Externalities: Policy and
Investment Implications, 12 EUR. INV. BANK PAPERS, no. 2, 2007, at 134, 137, 140
(stating that “the optimal outcome” can be met either by an emissions tax high
enough to “fully internalise the economic cost of emissions” or by supplementing a
lower tax rate “with direct technology support”).
2 See Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q.
903, 930-32 (2011) [hereinafter Renewables Revolution] (discussing the political
economy obstacles for carbon pricing policies).
3 For a discussion of the pros and cons of this approach, see Jonathan M. Gilligan
& Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political Feasibility in Climate Instrument
Choice, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5-26 (2014).
4 See, e.g., Bjorn Lomborg, Impact of Current Climate Proposals, 7 GLOBAL POL’Y
109, 111-17 (2016) (arguing that several major climate policy proposals will likely
prove ineffective).
5 See, e.g., Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and
Climate Law, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 387, 389, 393 (2017) (making the case that
“innovation snowballing” warrants greater government involvement in the promotion
of clean tech innovation).
6 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICA’S
ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 187-95 (2011); CHARLES WEISS & WILLIAM
B. BONVILLIAN, STRUCTURING AN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 209 (2009)
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Remarkably, these climate policy debates often turn not so much on
ideology or values, but instead on predictions about the future.
Advocates for a given policy make their case by forecasting that the
policy’s benefits will exceed its costs while opponents forecast the
opposite. Because of the uncertainty inherent in these forecasts, each
side can claim that the other is misguided, biased, or corrupt,
frequently leading to irresolvable disagreement and policy gridlock.
This Article argues that prediction markets offer hope for an escape
from this stalemate. Prediction markets are “designed and run for the
primary purpose of mining and aggregating information scattered
among traders and subsequently using this information in the form of
market values in order to make predictions about specific future
events.”7 In recent years, these markets have garnered increased media
attention following the proliferation of online betting exchanges that
allow participants (“traders”) to bet on whether certain events will
occur in the future. In the simplest type of prediction market, traders
buy a contract that pays $1 if the designated event happens, say the
Democratic candidate wins the presidency. In more complex
conditional prediction markets, traders bet that event x will happen
contingent on some other event y. Conditional markets are common
in the context of presidential elections.8 For example, a prediction
market contract for the 2020 presidential election might pay $1 if the
Democratic nominee wins, with bets called off unless the nominee is
Elizabeth Warren. If such a contract trades for $0.55, then we can
interpret its price as the market’s prediction that if Elizabeth Warren is
the Democratic nominee, she has a fifty-five percent chance of
winning the election.9
(observing that special interests can threaten to overshadow other goals); Richard G.
Newell, The Role of Energy Technology Policy Alongside Carbon Pricing, in
IMPLEMENTING A US CARBON TAX: CHALLENGES AND DEBATES 178, 188 (Ian Parry et al.
eds., 2015).
7 Georgios Tziralis & Ilias Tatsiopoulos, Prediction Markets: An Extended
Literature Review, 1 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no.1, 2007, at 75, 75 (2007). For reviews of
the academic literature on prediction markets, see generally id. and Christian F. Horn
et al., Prediction Markets - A Literature Review 2014 Following Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos,
8 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no.2, 2014, at 89, 89.
8 See generally Joyce E. Berg & Thomas A. Rietz, Prediction Markets as Decision
Support Systems, 5 INFO. SYS. FRONTIERS 79 (2003) (detailing how prediction markets
use information to make predictions in a variety of contexts, including the 1996
presidential election).
9 Since the contract pays $1 if Elizabeth Warren wins, then a price of $0.55
implies that the market gives Warren a fifty-five percent chance of winning if she is
the Democratic nominee. See Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Interpreting Prediction
Market Prices as Probabilities 8-12 (Inst. for Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Papers,
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We propose that policymakers sponsor similar markets for
predicting the success of climate policies conditioned on the adoption
of those policies. The government could, for example, use prediction
markets to forecast whether subsidizing research to develop a more
efficient gasoline engine would reduce carbon emissions in the
transportation sector. The market operator could issue a prediction
market contract that would pay $1 for each 100 million metric tons of
carbon emissions from the transportation sector in the year 2030. If
such a contract were selling for $20, its price would imply a forecast of
two billion metric tons. One version of the contract would be
conditioned on the government funding gasoline engine research and
another on the government not funding the research. The difference in
price would forecast the effect of the subsidy.
Prediction markets have been shown to outperform other
forecasting mechanisms in a wide range of contexts — from predicting
election outcomes and economic trends to guessing Oscar winners.10
Against this background, recent scholarship argues that prediction
markets could predict future temperature levels and help resolve the
debate over whether global warming is really a problem.11 Going one
step further, this Article explores the potential of conditional
prediction markets to forecast the effectiveness of competing climate
policy proposals and to assist policymakers with their selection,
design, and implementation.12
no. 2092, 2006) (Ger.).
10 See infra Part I.C.2.
11 See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.
179, 205-06 (2011); Shi-Ling Hsu, Climate Change Regulation and Prediction Markets,
REG., Summer 2014, at 36-37 (2014); Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Energy and
Climate Change: A Climate Prediction Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1962, 1966 (2014); see
also Elmira Aliakbari & Ross McKitrick, Information Aggregation in a Prediction
Market for Climate Outcomes 29-30 (Feb. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the University of Guelph) (Can.). Another recent paper explores whether
prediction markets might generate a consensus on the factors that cause climate
change. John J. Nay et al., Betting and Belief: Prediction Markets and Attribution of
Climate Change, in IEEE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 WINTER SIMULATION CONFERENCE
1666, 1666 (T.M.K. Roeder et al. eds., 2016).
12 The work closest to our own is an article by Scott Sumner and Aaron Jackson in
which they proposed a set of prediction markets designed to forecast global
temperature and greenhouse gas levels, and they briefly discussed in general terms
how those markets might assist policymakers and help shape policy. Scott Sumner &
Aaron L. Jackson, Using Prediction Markets to Guide Global Warming Policy §§ 4-5
(Dec. 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.econmodels.com/upload7282/
efae68d98251d757b48dfaef0295c28e.pdf. Similarly, Sebastian Goers and his
colleagues have suggested that prediction markets might help policymakers predict if
and when certain environmentally friendly technologies will be invented. Sebastian R.
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Part I makes the case that prediction markets have the potential to
significantly improve upon the decision-making procedures of
traditional legal institutions. Drawing on the literature on government
failure, we examine specific reasons why policymakers and regulators
sometimes act contrary to the public interest, including information
deficits, cognitive and emotional biases, and special interest influence.
We also survey existing mechanisms for addressing these problems,
such as cost-benefit analysis and expert deliberation, and discuss their
limitations. We then lay out the potential of prediction markets to
improve government decision making through more reliable and
transparent forecasts that aggregate widely dispersed information in an
unbiased way untainted by interest group politics.
Part II argues that the government should use prediction markets to
better allocate green subsidies to promote clean technology
innovation. In the short term, we advocate for incremental changes to
the process by which grant-making agencies fund clean-technology
research. The Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Project
Agency-Energy program (“ARPA-E”), for example, could immediately
incorporate prediction markets into its project-funding decisions
without the need for congressional action. Smaller-scale
experimentation with prediction markets by ARPA-E would allow for
the development of an empirical track record of prediction market
performance in federal agencies. Once prediction markets prove
themselves, more radical reforms could include the use of these
markets by Congress in allocating larger sums of money.
Moving from the federal to the state level, Part III discusses ways in
which states could incorporate prediction markets to improve their
climate and energy policies. Without a coherent federal policy strategy
to address climate change and promote clean energy, states have
emerged as key drivers of climate change mitigation and clean energy
innovation.13 With a veritable potpourri of policies in place, states are
Goers et al., New and Old Market-Based Instruments for Climate Change Policy, 12
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y STUD. 1, 23-26 (2010).
13 Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1625-26, 162930 (2015) [hereinafter Clean Energy Federalism] (exploring the ideal institutional level
of implementation for select climate and clean energy policies); Felix Mormann,
Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory Opportunities for State Climate Policy
Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 190-91 (2017) [hereinafter Constitutional
Challenges] (discussing constitutional limitations on the freedom of states to adopt
effective climate and clean energy policies). For an overview of state climate policy
actions, see Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local
Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 123-24 (2008); Daniel A.
Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 883-92
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living up to the Brandeisian ideal of “laboratories of democracy.”14 But
which policies best tackle the daunting challenges presented by
climate change? Prediction markets have the potential to shed light on
this critical question as well as increase the benefits and reduce the
risks inherent in state climate policy experimentation.
I.

HOW TRADITIONAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS CAN BENEFIT FROM
PREDICTION MARKETS

This Part discusses reasons why policymakers may sometimes adopt
ineffective or inefficient policies and explains some of the problems
that plague existing legal institutions. We then discuss the potential
for prediction markets to address these problems.
A. Why Legislatures Sometimes Adopt Bad Laws
Voters likely have at least some influence over public policy.15 As a
result, understanding legislative decision making starts with
understanding voter behavior. The notion that politicians respond to
voters’ policy preferences may seem like welcome news in a
democracy. The ideal of democratically legitimized policy choices,
however, ignores the reality that many voters are woefully ignorant
about politics and policy.16 Moreover, voters often suffer from
cognitive and emotional biases that lead them to support or oppose
particular policies even though they might not do so if they were fully
informed and unbiased.17
That voters’ policy preferences are often biased and uninformed
should come as no surprise. Public policy is complex, a single vote is
rarely decisive,18 and most of the consequences of bad policies fall on
(2008); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation:
Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 683-88 (2008).
14 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
15 See JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT: HOW PUBLIC OPINION SHAPES AMERICAN
POLITICS xvi (2004); Paul Burstein, The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A
Review and an Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 29, 36 (2003); Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out
of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 127, 138 (2002).
16 See MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62-104 (1996); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 17-61 (2013).
17 For a review of the literature on voter biases, see generally Gary M. Lucas, Jr., &
Slavisa Tasic, Behavioral Public Choice and the Law, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 199 (2015).
18 DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 304-05 (2003); see also Jonathan R.
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others.19 As a result, individual voters have little incentive to seek out
all relevant information. Moreover, unbiased thinking requires
significant effort and our minds are usually lazy.20 When people are
uninformed and lack motivation, they often analyze complex
problems superficially by invoking simple cues and decision heuristics
that can result in errors.21 For example, voters sometimes invoke the
availability heuristic — a tendency to estimate the importance and
frequency of an event based upon how easy it is to recall examples of
it — leading them to prioritize threats that are familiar, salient, and
accompanied by vivid news images (e.g., terrorism), over those that
are not (e.g., climate change).22
When it comes to climate policy, the public’s views on particular
policy instruments often contradict expert opinion in ways that are
hard to explain without resorting to psychology. For instance, voters
strongly support command-and-control regulations and green
subsidies, which many economists condemn as inefficient, yet voters
steadfastly oppose a carbon tax, which experts maintain would reduce
carbon emissions at a much lower cost.23 One possible explanation for
the difference between expert and voter opinion is that voters engage
in a sort of intuitive cost-benefit analysis that is biased against a
carbon tax because, relative to alternative policies, the costs of the tax
are more salient while the benefits are less so.24
While voter bias and ignorance present significant hurdles to
effective climate policy, politicians probably have some slack to ignore
voters’ wishes and implement their own agenda. Perhaps voters simply
fail to pay attention or they are subject to partisan bias and dutifully
support the politicians currently in control of their favored party even
if this means modifying their own policy views.25 In theory, politicians
Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 43, 46-51 (1988) (discussing the groups likely to drive legislation).
For an assessment of conventional public choice narrative in an environmental policy
context, see Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 559-71 (2001).
19 See Bryan Caplan, Majorities Against Utility: Implications of the Failure of the
Miracle of Aggregation, 26 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 198, 207-08 (2008).
20 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 39-49 (2011).
21 See THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 281-86 (3d ed. 2013).
22 Cass R, Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
Climate Change, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 195, 200-03 (2006).
23 Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Voter Psychology and the Carbon Tax, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 1113 (2017).
24 Id. at 22.
25 See CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY
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could use the slack that they possess to promote the public interest,
correcting for voter biases. Unfortunately, politicians may be selfinterested,26 beholden to special interest groups,27 hampered by a lack
of information and policy expertise,28 and subject to the same biases
that plague voters.29
Not surprisingly then, it is easy to identify climate and
environmental legislation that is inefficient and, in some cases, even
counterproductive.30 For example, subsidies for ethanol, which are
backed by politicians and voters alike, have cost billions of tax dollars
while producing little, if any, environmental benefit.31 This and other
examples of bad environmental legislation motivate the search for
decision-making mechanisms that will improve public policy.
B. Why Administrative Agencies Make Mistakes
Given the problems with legislative decision making, delegating
climate policy to administrative agencies seems appealing. Bureaucrats
are arguably more insulated than legislators from public pressure and
interest group lobbying, and their narrow jurisdictional focus allows
them to develop greater technical expertise specific to their field.32 Yet,
there are many reasons why even agencies may make significant
mistakes.
First, while bureaucrats have some slack to ignore the preferences of
voters and politicians, politicians have various means for keeping
agencies in line, including control over agency budgets and staffing
ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 309-10 (Tali Mendelberg ed.,
2016).
26 See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES
BUCHANAN 1, 18-30 (1999).
27 MUELLER, supra note 18, at 475-76, 489-90, 493-94 (analyzing the theory that
interest groups affect legislators’ votes).
28 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR
HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR
COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 26-29 (1981).
29 Lucas & Tasic, supra note 17, at 214-15.
30 See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 28, at 2; GRAETZ, supra note 6; NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 3-7
(William Nordhaus et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter TAX POLICY].
31 Robert Hahn & Caroline Cecot, The Benefits and Costs of Ethanol: An Evaluation
of the Government’s Analysis, 35 J. REG. ECON. 275, 275-80, 283-285 (2009); see NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TAX POLICY, supra note 30, at 97-102.
32 JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
351-55 (2d ed. 2013) (reviewing the literature on this point).
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decisions.33 Consequently, agency decision making is not immune to
the biases of voters and politicians or to political corruption.34 Second,
bureaucrats may themselves be captured by special interest groups.35
The mechanisms of regulatory capture include “cultural capture,” in
which regulatory actions serve the ends of a special interest group
because bureaucrats have come to identify members of that group as
part of their own in-group and have formed close relationships with
them, perhaps as a result of the revolving door between industry and
government.36 Third, some bureaucrats may be less concerned about
the public interest than they are about career advancement and
protecting their own jobs, salaries, and reputations, or about
maximizing the power and budgets of the agencies for which they
work.37 Fourth, like voters and politicians, bureaucrats may suffer
33 Id. at 406-544; see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2298 (2001); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 246-47, 273-74 (1987);
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440-44, 468-82
(1989).
34 See SOMIN, supra note 16, at 184 (arguing that voter ignorance and irrationality
are “likely to reduce the quality of any delegations to experts that are enacted into
law”). For examples of how political pressure has influenced agency decision making
in the environmental context, see Robert R. Kuehn, Bias in Environmental Agency
Decision Making, 45 ENVTL. L. 957, 959-61 (2015). For a famous case study
demonstrating how political pressure undermined automobile safety regulation and
encouraged an aggressive focus on recalling defective automobiles that likely
contributed little to vehicle safety, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Law and Engineering: In Search
of the Law-Science Problem, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 141-44 (2003); see also
Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration: Legal Determinants of Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 443, 465, 478-79 (1990). For a discussion of how industry threats might
persuade bureaucrats to act against the public interest, see Sanford C. Gordon &
Catherine Hafer, Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the
Bureaucracy, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 258 (2005). A related concern arises if
bureaucrats know that their mistakes will come to light if they harm an industry
group, but not if they harm the public interest. See Clare Leaver, Bureaucratic Minimal
Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies, 99 AM. ECON. REV.
572, 573-74 (2009).
35 For a compilation of recent contributions to the regulatory capture literature,
see generally PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW
TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) [hereinafter PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE]. For examples of regulatory capture in the environmental
context, see Kuehn, supra note 34, at 958-60.
36 James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE supra note 35, at 71, 79-98.
37 For a discussion of several models of bureaucratic behavior, see MUELLER, supra
note 18, at 359-85.
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from cognitive and emotional biases, including ideological bias,
overconfidence in their ability to create welfare-improving regulations,
and tunnel vision, or the tendency to focus excessively on their
agency’s narrowly defined mission while ignoring competing
concerns.38 Finally, when relevant information is broadly dispersed,
individual bureaucrats may not know enough to decide wisely. A
notorious example of this phenomenon was the consistent failure of
central planners in the Soviet Union to properly allocate goods and
resources due to lack of information about what was needed when and
where.39
While these problems with agency decision making are troubling
and potentially significant, various administrative procedures seek to
address them. The notice-and-comment rulemaking process40 and
centralized review of agency rules by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs41 aim to promote transparency and accountability,
help agencies gather dispersed information, and counteract biases
such as tunnel vision. As a last resort, courts can strike down
regulations that they deem arbitrary.42 While helpful, these procedural
safeguards are no panacea.43
Four mechanisms designed to promote better bureaucratic decisions
are worth discussing in detail. As we will show, group deliberation,
peer review, cost-benefit analysis, and expert surveys can help
policymakers, but also introduce significant concerns of their own. As
a result, these decision-making mechanisms can potentially be
replaced or improved upon by prediction markets.
As with prediction markets, the goal of group deliberation is to
aggregate dispersed information as well as mitigate individual biases.
The literature on group decision making, however, shows that
deliberating groups suffer from four major flaws.44 First, they often
amplify the biases and errors of individual group members. Second,
38

Lucas & Tasic, supra note 17, at 252-57.
See Richard E. Ericson, The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System
and Implications for Reform, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11, 15-25 (1991).
40 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
41 For a discussion of how the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
operates, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY
STATE 11-46 (2014).
42 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2018).
43 See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1263-1311 (2006); Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36-40 (2003).
44 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 75 (2006)
[hereinafter INFOTOPIA].
39
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they frequently fail to elicit all relevant information from members,
giving too much weight to information possessed by all members and
too little weight to information known to only a few. Third, they are
prone to informational and reputational cascades whereby group
members conceal their doubts (and the information prompting them)
about the group’s decision out of deference to the majority or for fear
of reputational harm. Finally, they often produce group polarization,
which occurs when group members initially lean in a particular
direction (e.g., favoring the death penalty) and deliberation pushes
them further in that direction because arguments favoring that
position are more likely to be mentioned and social pressure yields
conformity. As a result, deliberating groups are especially likely to
make bad decisions when a large proportion of group members are
biased, important information is known to only a few members who
remain silent, and the group is highly cohesive so that members feel
intense pressure to conform and to reject the views of outsiders.45
Peer review is a procedure frequently employed by government
agencies in the selection process for research grants. Despite peer
review’s status among scientists as a venerable institution, evidence of
its effectiveness is mixed. On one hand, a recent study of grants made
by the National Institutes of Health found a “one-standard deviation
worse peer-review score among awarded grants [to be] associated with
15% fewer citations, 7% fewer publications, 19% fewer high-impact
publications, and 14% fewer follow-on patents,” even after controlling
for various characteristics of the grant recipient.46 These numbers
suggest that peer review can help effectively allocate grant money to
those researchers whose work will have the greatest impact. On the
other hand, another recent study found evidence of significant bias in
peer review and in particular that “evaluators systematically give lower
scores to research proposals that are closer to their own areas of
expertise and to those that are highly novel.”47 Beyond the grant
selection process, numerous scholars have documented problems with
peer review as part of the article selection process for academic

45

Id. at 75-102.
Danielle Li & Leila Agha, Big Names or Big Ideas: Do Peer-Review Panels Select
the Best Science Proposals?, 348 SCI. 434, 434 (2015).
47 Kevin J. Boudreau et al., Looking Across and Looking Beyond the Knowledge
Frontier: Intellectual Distance, Novelty, and Resource Allocation in Science, 62 MGMT.
SCI. 2765, 2765 (2016); see also Thomas O. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal
Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 38-55 (1994) (discussing possible
biases in the peer review process).
46
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journals.48 The primary lesson of this literature is that peer review
likely has some value, but also suffers from significant drawbacks,
particularly when it comes to evaluating highly innovative ideas.
Cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) is a well-established feature of agency
decision making and is generally required for any significant
regulatory action at the federal level.49 CBA can facilitate transparency
and accountability50 as well as correct various biases (cognitive or
otherwise) by forcing bureaucrats to carefully consider the likely
consequences of proposed regulations.51 Nevertheless, CBA is
controversial in part because it requires estimating future costs and
benefits that may be very difficult to forecast.52 Moreover, the
government often fails to conduct CBA properly in compliance with
guidelines suggested by regulatory experts or the Office of
Management and Budget.53
Finally, expert surveys seek to leverage the knowledge and
experience of the brightest minds in a given field. The problem with
expert surveys, however, is that experts may be unreliable, particularly
given their lack of incentive for accuracy. When it comes to
forecasting, experts often make poor predictions.54 Moreover, experts
may be corrupt or perceived as such,55 tell people what they want to
48 E.g., DAVID SHATZ, PEER REVIEW: A CRITICAL INQUIRY 35-108 (2004); Juan Miguel
Campanario, Peer Review for Journals as It Stands Today: Part 1, 19 SCI. COMM. 181,
191-203 (1998); Juan Miguel Campanario, Peer Review for Journals as It Stands Today:
Part 2, 19 SCI. COMM. 277, 280-82 (1998); Peter M. Rothwell & Christopher N.
Martyn, Reproducibility of Peer Review in Clinical Neuroscience: Is Agreement Between
Reviewers Any Greater than Would Be Expected by Chance Alone?, 123 BRAIN 1964,
1966-68 (2000).
49 For a discussion of this requirement, see MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note
32, at 513-32.
50 See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive
Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1140-41 (2001).
51 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1059 (2000).
52 See Amy Sinden, Cost-Benefit Analysis, in DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 295, 304-05 (LeRoy C. Paddock et al. eds., 2016).
53 Robert W. Hahn, An Evaluation of Government Efforts to Improve Regulatory
Decision Making, 3 INT’L REV. ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 245, 258-59 (2009).
54 See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW CAN
WE KNOW? 25-66 (2005) (presenting substantial evidence that dilettantes and simple
algorithms often beat expert forecasts).
55 See, e.g., Robin Cooper Feldman et al., Open Letter on Ethical Norms in
Intellectual Property Scholarship, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 340 (2016); Eric Lipton et
al., Think Tank Scholar or Corporate Consultant? It Depends on the Day, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/us/politics/think-tank-scholarscorporate-consultants.html; Brody Mullins & Jack Nicas, Paying Professors: Inside
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hear even if it is not true,56 herd with other experts to protect their
professional reputations,57 and fall victim to the subtle biases present
within their field.58
C. Prediction Markets: A Catalyst for Better Legislative and Agency
Decision Making
This section argues that prediction markets have the potential to
improve climate policy by addressing some of the problems with
existing legal institutions and processes outlined above. We begin by
surveying the theory and evidence that prediction markets improve on
other forecasting techniques. We then explain features beyond mere
forecast accuracy that should make prediction markets attractive to
policymakers.
1.

More Accurate Forecasts: Theory

Economists have long recognized the power of prices to convey
information.59 As applied to prediction markets, rational expectations
theory60 and the strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis61
imply that prediction markets accurately forecast future events
because the marginal trader in the market has unbiased expectations
and market prices incorporate all relevant information, making it
Google’s Academic Influence Campaign, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2017, 9:14 AM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/paying-professors-inside-googles-academic-influencecampaign-1499785286.
56 See Canice Prendergast, A Theory of “Yes Men,” 83 AM. ECON. REV. 757, 757-59
(1993).
57 See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465-67 (1990).
58 See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCI.
1668, 1671-73 (1989) (discussing biases to which psychologists are subject); Lee
Jussim et al., Ideological Bias in Social Psychological Research, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND POLITICS 91, 98-105 (Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., 2015) (presenting evidence of
ideological bias in social psychology); Luigi Zingales, Preventing Economists’ Capture,
in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 35, at 124, 130-44 (providing evidence
of bias among economists and discussing the mechanisms contributing to it).
59 See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 5,
12-13 (2005) (This article was originally published by The American Economic Review
in 1945.).
60 See generally SANFORD J. GROSSMAN, THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF PRICES 11-40
(1989); STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS (2d ed. 1996).
61 See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1577,
1603-08 (1991); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 409-13 (1970).
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impossible to improve upon the predictions implied by those prices.62
Even if real-world prediction markets are less than perfectly efficient,63
there are reasons to believe that they will often outperform other
forecasting techniques, including forecasting by means of expert
surveys or group deliberation.
First, prediction markets that are open to a large group of traders
aggregate information that is widely dispersed.64 Such “markets
provide a centralized locus for information aggregation” so that
anyone with relevant information knows where to go to disclose it and
how.65 Moreover, “the market provides an algorithm for aggregating
opinions.”66 Unlike group deliberation, which often adheres to the
“principle of ‘one person, one vote,’” prediction markets allow traders
to register their confidence in their views by increasing the amount
wagered.67 In addition, anyone with relevant information can
participate regardless of social or professional status.68 Relatedly, if the
62 See John O. Ledyard, Designing Information Markets for Policy Analysis, in
INFORMATION MARKETS: A NEW WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS 37, 41-42 (Robert W. Hahn
& Paul C. Tetlock eds., 2006); Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2004, at 107, 108 [hereinafter Prediction Markets].
63 The stock market provides evidence that speculative markets can be efficient.
See generally Mark Rubinstein, Rational Markets: Yes or No? The Affirmative Case, 57
FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 2001, at 15 (presenting evidence that index funds, which
are speculative in nature, consistently outperform actively managed mutual funds).
Moreover, “betting markets have offered support in favor of the efficient markets
hypothesis, especially in the market for all games in a given sport over a long time
horizon.” Rodney J. Paul & Andrew P. Weinbach, Uses of Sports Wagering-Based
Prediction Markets Outside of the World of Gambling, in PREDICTION MARKETS: THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS 157, 157 (Leighton Vaughan Williams ed., 2011); cf. Anastasios
Oikonomidis & Johnnie Johnson, Who Can Beat the Odds? The Case of Football Betting
Reviewed, in PREDICTION MARKETS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, supra, at 204, 206-08,
217 (reviewing the literature on the efficiency of soccer betting markets and
concluding that “even though opportunities for profit theoretically exist, only the
fastest, most efficient and highly determined players are likely to convert theory to
practice and benefit from inefficient pricing in the football betting market”). For
evidence that prediction markets are not perfectly efficient, see Joyce E. Berg &
Thomas A. Rietz, Longshots, Overconfidence and Efficiency on the Iowa Electronic
Market 17-27 (Sept. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1645062. For similar evidence related to experimental
prediction markets, see Charles Noussair, Experimental Prediction and Pari-Mutuel
Betting Markets, in PREDICTION MARKETS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, supra, at 174, 180-82.
64 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 121.
65 M. Todd Henderson et al., Predicting Crime, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 23-24 (2010).
66 Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 121 (emphasis
omitted).
67 SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 44, at 130-31.
68 Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 21.
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opinions of traders are sufficiently diverse, prediction markets can
take advantage of the wisdom of crowds, a phenomenon whereby
forecasting errors by individuals tend to cancel each other out in the
aggregate so that the resulting group forecast is more accurate than
individual forecasts.69
Second, in contrast to group deliberation, prediction markets create
an incentive for people to reveal policy-relevant information that they
might otherwise fail to disclose.70 Specifically, traders who have
information suggesting that the market price is wrong can profit by
trading on that information, thereby moving the market toward the
efficient price.71
Third, prediction markets create an incentive for more and better
research because traders with better information have an advantage in
the market.72 When expert forecasts disagree with the market price,
experts can either bet on their models or revisit their assumptions to
try to ascertain the source of the disagreement.73
Fourth, relative to other forecasting mechanisms, prediction
markets may better evaluate information and more quickly
incorporate new data.74 As mentioned above, traders who are more
certain about the quality of their information can register their
conviction by betting more money.75 Conversely, traders who are
wrong lose money, so uninformed people have an incentive to stay out
of the market. This feature distinguishes prediction markets from
group deliberation, a setting in which talk is cheap and participants
are not forced to put their money where their mouths are.
Finally, prediction markets create incentives to avoid biases in
forecasting, whether cognitive, emotional, reputational, or financial. A
strong body of evidence suggests that better incentives can reduce
bias, especially cognitive and emotional bias, and improve decision
69 For a review of the literature on the wisdom of crowds, see Joseph P. Simmons
et al., Intuitive Biases in Choice Versus Estimation: Implications for the Wisdom of
Crowds, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 1, 1-2 (2011). The authors note that under the wisdom
of crowds theory a crowd’s judgment is most likely to be accurate “when the crowds’
judges are (1) knowledgeable, (2) motivated to be accurate, (3) independent, and (4)
diverse.” Id. at 2.
70 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 121.
71 For evidence that prediction markets are generally efficient in the sense of
allowing few opportunities for arbitrage, see id. at 116-19.
72 Id. at 121.
73 Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 24.
74 See Oleg Bondarenko & Peter Bossaerts, Expectations and Learning in Iowa, 24 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1535, 1545-50 (2000).
75 Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 23.
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making.76 With their promise of monetary reward, prediction markets
provide strong incentives for unbiased forecasting. Similarly, the
ability of traders to participate anonymously in prediction markets
eliminates the risk of reputational damage that comes with sharing
information as part of a deliberating group.77 Importantly, a prediction
market can function well even if many traders within the market are
biased, as long as the marginal trader — the one who sets the market
clearing price — is not.78
2.

More Accurate Forecasts: Empirical Evidence

As compelling as the theoretical case for prediction markets is, the
primary reason to believe that they can be useful to policymakers is
their strong track record of forecast accuracy. Over several decades
and across various domains, speculative markets, including prediction
markets, have fared well relative to expert predictions and other
forecasting mechanisms. Moreover, unlike algorithms, which are often
highly specific to a given field, prediction markets are versatile enough
to deliver forecasts in a variety of policy-relevant contexts.
To illustrate, consider the following summary of the empirical
evidence. Prediction markets generally outperform polls in predicting
election outcomes.79 Horse race bettors beat horse race experts.80
Economic derivatives markets beat the average forecast of a panel of

76 See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Economic Incentives Transform
Psychological Anomalies, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 215, 225-26, 229-30 (1994)
(explaining that the frequency and magnitude of bias or irrational behavior lessen
when incentives are introduced); Erik Hoelzl & Aldo Rustichini, Overconfident: Do
You Put Your Money on It?, 115 ECON. J. 305, 315-17 (2005) (summarizing results
suggesting subjects’ overconfidence bias may be reduced when money is at stake);
Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and
Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1633-36 (2006) (discussing incentives’
“role in the quality of judgment and choice”); cf. Colin F. Camerer & Robin M.
Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-LaborProduction Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 34-36 (1999) (explaining that
sometimes incentives improve performance but often they do not).
77 SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 44, at 104-05.
78 See Adam Mann, Market Forecasts, 538 NATURE 308, 310 (2016).
79 E.g., Joyce E. Berg et al., Prediction Market Accuracy in the Long Run, 24 INT’L. J.
FORECASTING 285, 286 (2008); Joyce Berg et al., Results from a Dozen Years of Election
Futures Markets Research, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 742,
746-48 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008) [hereinafter Results]; Wolfers
& Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 112.
80 See Stephen Figlewski, Subjective Information and Market Efficiency in a Betting
Market, 87 J. POL. ECON. 75, 82-87 (1979).
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experts in predicting economic outcomes.81 Orange juice futures
improve upon weather forecasts.82 Stock prices identified the firm
whose defective part caused the Challenger space shuttle crash well
before the official investigation concluded.83 Numerous companies
have found that their internal prediction markets outperform expert
forecasts in predicting product sales volume.84 Furthermore,
prediction markets have succeeded in forecasting the outcomes of
sporting events,85 movie box office receipts,86 Oscar winners,87
Google’s market capitalization prior to its initial public offering,88 a
company’s ability to meet project deadlines,89 the reproducibility of
published scientific research results,90 and flu outbreaks.91 Finally, in
experiments designed to test their performance and limitations, “[t]he
data give an encouraging, though qualified, picture of prediction
81 See Refet S. Gürkaynak & Justin Wolfers, Macroeconomic Derivatives: An Initial
Analysis of Market-Based Macro Forecasts, Uncertainty, and Risk, in NBER
INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON MACROECONOMICS 2005, at 11, 15-20 (Jeffrey A. Frankel &
Christopher A. Pissarides eds., 2007).
82 See Richard Roll, Orange Juice and Weather, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 861, 868-73
(1984).
83 Michael T. Maloney & J. Harold Mulherin, The Complexity of Price Discovery in
an Efficient Market: The Stock Market Reaction to the Challenger Crash, 9 J. CORP. FIN.
453, 453, 473-74 (2003).
84 E.g., Bo Cowgill & Eric Zitzewitz, Corporate Prediction Markets: Evidence from
Google, Ford, and Firm X, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 1309, 1310, 1337 (2015); Emile
Servan-Schreiber, Prediction Markets: Trading Uncertainty for Collective Wisdom, in
COLLECTIVE WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 21, 29 (Hélène Landemore & Jon
Elster eds., 2012); Charles R. Plott & Kay-Yut Chen, Information Aggregation
Mechanisms: Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem 13-14
(Cal. Inst. Tech. Soc. Sci., Working Paper No. 1131, 2002) (Hewlett-Packard). For a
detailed review of the use of prediction markets by private firms, see DONALD N.
THOMPSON, ORACLES: HOW PREDICTION MARKETS TURN EMPLOYEES INTO VISIONARIES 3130 (2012).
85 See, e.g., Emile Servan-Schreiber et al., Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter?,
14 ELECTRONIC MKTS. 243, 250 (2004).
86 See, e.g., Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 113-14.
87 See, e.g., Deepak Pathak et al., A Comparison of Forecasting Methods:
Fundamentals, Polling, Prediction Markets, and Experts, 9 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no. 2,
2015, at 1, 23-25.
88 See Joyce E. Berg et al., Searching for Google’s Value: Using Prediction Markets to
Forecast Market Capitalization Prior to an Initial Public Offering, 55 MGMT. SCI. 348,
349 (2009).
89 See SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 44, at 116-17.
90 See Anna Dreber et al., Using Prediction Markets to Estimate the Reproducibility of
Scientific Research, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 15343, 15343-45 (2015).
91 See Philip M. Polgreen et al., Using Prediction Markets to Forecast Trends in
Infectious Diseases, 1 MICROBE 459, 463-64 (2006).
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market performance” suggesting that prediction markets are “typically
beneficial.”92
While harnessing the full power of prediction markets likely
requires allowing bets for real money, empirical evidence suggests that
even markets based on play money or prizes can be remarkably
accurate.93 Private firms often use markets of this type to circumvent
gambling restrictions, and many have found that the opportunity for
bragging rights proves sufficient to motivate informed and unbiased
trading.94
Notwithstanding this impressive empirical record, we readily
acknowledge that prediction markets have limitations and do not
function as a crystal ball. Specifically, they can prove inaccurate when
traders, even in the aggregate, do not have all the relevant information
needed to make an accurate prediction. This could be because the
relevant information is unknown or hard to piece together, in which
case, other prediction mechanisms are also likely to perform poorly.
Another possibility is that a small group of people have a monopoly on
valuable information relevant to the market, but either they are not
trading or the potential that they might trade drives others out of the
market.95 This likely explains why prediction markets failed to predict
that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction or that President
Bush would appoint John Roberts to the Supreme Court.96
Yet, the fact that prediction markets sometimes fail to accurately
predict an event does not mean that they are hopelessly flawed or
useless. As a case in point, consider the high-profile failure of
prediction markets to forecast Donald Trump’s victory over Hillary
Clinton in the 2016 presidential election. While it is true that the
major prediction markets suggested that Trump had only between a

92 Noussair, supra note 63, at 185-86; see also Gerrit H. Van Bruggen et al.,
Prediction Markets as Institutional Forecasting Support Systems, 49 DECISION SUPPORT
SYS. 404, 410-13 (2010) (presenting experimental evidence that prediction markets
perform as well as or better than traditional forecasting mechanisms).
93 See e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 84, at 113, 115-16 (noting the “endowment
effect” of play money); Sebastian Diemer & Joaquin Poblete, Real-Money vs. PlayMoney Forecasting Accuracy in Online Prediction Markets: Empirical Insights From
iPredict, 4 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no.3, 2010, at 21, 43; Servan-Schreiber et al., supra
note 85, at 250.
94 See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 84, at 89-91 (noting that Google uses play
money markets to avoid gambling restrictions); see Mann, supra note 78, at 310
(noting “several studies have shown that traders can be equally well motivated by the
prestige of being right”); Servan-Schreiber et al., supra note 85, at 244-45.
95 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 121.
96 SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 44, at 134-36.
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six percent and twenty-five percent chance of winning, it is also true
that a small chance does not mean no chance. Moreover, Trump won
by a thin margin. He lost the popular vote by nearly three million
votes and narrowly won the electoral college thanks to razor-thin
victories in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin.97 Consequently,
the popular notion that his victory was somehow inevitable is likely
nothing more than hindsight bias. More importantly, in forecasting
the election results, prediction markets generally did as well as or
better than alternative approaches, including statistical poll
aggregators.98 All the evidence suggests that the outcome of the 2016
presidential election was very hard to predict. This raises an important
point: even though prediction markets are imperfect, they can still be
valuable as long as they perform well relative to other forecasting
mechanisms.99
3.

Other Benefits of Prediction Markets

In addition to improving forecasts, prediction markets possess other
attractive features. First, they have the potential to provide
policymakers with an easy-to-find, readily digestible, and highly
reliable summary of complex information relevant to a particular
policy, similar to the way in which stock prices summarize the value
of firms.100 Second, “markets provide instantaneous and continuous
feedback to information providers through prices,” ensuring that
policymakers receive the most up-to-date information.101 Third,
prediction markets have the potential to promote more effective
policymaking by increasing transparency and combating the
perception that government forecasts are biased or influenced by
special interest groups.102 Moreover, if regulators choose to ignore
97 FED. ELECTION COMM’N, OFFICIAL 2016 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
1-2, 6 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf; Philip
Bump, Donald Trump Will Be President Thanks to 80,000 People in Three States, WASH.
POST (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/01/
donald-trump-will-be-president-thanks-to-80000-people-in-three-states/.
98 See Lumenogic, Did Donald Trump the Wisdom of Crowds?, HYPERMIND GAZETTE
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://blog.hypermind.com/2016/11/14/donald-trumps-the-wisdomof-crowds/.
99 Robin Hanson, Shall We Vote on Values, but Bet on Beliefs?, 21 J. POL. PHIL. 151,
155-56 (2013) [hereinafter Bet on Beliefs].
100 Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 23-24.
101 Id. at 24.
102 See Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking,
and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 971 (2004) [hereinafter
Information Markets]; Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Using Information Markets
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prediction market forecasts, the media, the public, and perhaps even
the courts can hold them accountable by placing the burden on them
to explain why.103 Finally, prediction markets offer special appeal to
conservatives who tend to be deeply distrustful of government
forecasts and the policymaking process. Market-oriented conservatives
may trust prediction market forecasts more than those issued by
bureaucrats, academics, and other experts whom they often associate
— justly or not — with the Democratic party.
II.

PREDICTION MARKETS TO DIRECT GREEN SUBSIDIES

As we mentioned at the outset, most policy experts argue that
seriously addressing climate change will require placing a price on
carbon, and many advocate for a carbon tax.104 If the government
eventually adopts a carbon tax, the tax would yield considerable
revenue, which raises the question of what to do with it. One option
would be to use some substantial portion to fund green subsidies,
including clean energy research and development. While a carbon tax
remains widely unpopular, public support increases significantly when
proposals stipulate that the government would use the resulting
revenue to fund environmental programs.105 In addition, several
prominent economists have argued that the government may be able
to drastically reduce the overall cost of climate change mitigation by
making a large investment in clean technology that pushes the
economy away from fossil fuels toward clean energy.106 Remarkably,
proposals for increased government spending to fund clean energy
research have received support from climate and energy policy
scholars across the political spectrum.107 In sum, green subsidies have
broad appeal among both experts and the public.
to Improve Public Decision Making, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 263-64 (2005).
103 Cf. Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 42 (“One benefit of this transparency is
that it would encourage political accountability — politicians who opt to ignore the
market would likely have to build a strong case for their position.”).
104 See supra note 1.
105 See Andrea Baranzini & Stefano Carattini, Effectiveness, Earmarking, and
Labeling: Testing the Acceptability of Carbon Taxes with Survey Data, 19 ENVTL. ECON.
& POL’Y STUD. 197, 211-13 (2017); Simon Dresner et al., Social and Political Responses
to Ecological Tax Reform in Europe: An Introduction to the Special Issue, 34 ENERGY POL’Y
895, 900-01 (2006); Steffen Kallbekken & Marianne Aasen, The Demand for
Earmarking: Results from a Focus Group Study, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2183, 2187
(2010).
106 See, e.g., PHILIPPE AGHION ET AL., CTR. FOR CHANGE ECON. & POL’Y, PATH
DEPENDENCE, INNOVATION, AND THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2014).
107 See, e.g., STEVEN F. HAYWARD ET AL., POST-PARTISAN POWER: HOW A LIMITED AND

1450

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:1429

While green subsidies may sound good in theory, they could easily
become a nightmare in practice. After all, the government has a mixed
track record in choosing what technologies and activities to
subsidize.108 Special interest influence is a major concern in this
context. Dieter Helm, for example, has argued that the European
Union’s climate policies have conferred large economic rents on
special interests and have locked in investment in costly offshore wind
at the expense of other, more promising renewables.109
Even when government is acting in good faith and in pursuit of the
public interest, solutions are not always obvious. Simply investing in
technologies that reduce emissions relative to the status quo may
prove counterproductive. Zachary Liscow and Quentin Karpilow, for
instance, have argued that fuel efficiency standards for automobiles,
which many environmentalists support, “may perversely undermine
climate efforts to the extent that they direct innovation away from
zero-emission cars and toward improving the fuel efficiency of fossilfuel vehicles.”110 Similarly, Philippe Aghion and his colleagues have
suggested that policies designed to encourage the transition from coal
to cleaner natural gas may reduce emissions in the short run, but they

DIRECT APPROACH TO ENERGY INNOVATION CAN DELIVER CLEAN, CHEAP ENERGY,
ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY AND NATIONAL PROSPERITY 5-7 (2010); Jonathan H. Adler,
Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization,
35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 42-45 (2011); Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating
Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 557, 582-87 (2009) [hereinafter Climate
Policy]; Mormann, Renewables Revolution, supra note 2, at 943-48.
108 GRAETZ, supra note 6, at 187-95; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROSPECTIVE
EVALUATION OF APPLIED ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT DOE (PHASE TWO) 8
(2007); Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, An Assessment of R&D Commercialization
Programs, in THE TECHNOLOGY PORK BARREL 365, 365-92 (Linda R. Cohen & Roger G.
Noll eds., 1991); see JOHN A. ALIC ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S.
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION POLICIES: LESSONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 11, 18-19 tbl.1
(2003) (“[W]here government has sought to define technical attributes or design
features and ‘pick winners’ in the marketplace, failure has been a common outcome.”);
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY RESEARCH AT DOE: WAS IT WORTH IT? ENERGY
EFFICIENCY AND FOSSIL ENERGY RESEARCH 1978 TO 2000, at 6-8 (2001); NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, TAX POLICY, supra note 30, at 98-99 (concluding that tax subsidies for
ethanol have produced little if any environmental benefit); Richard G. Newell, The
Energy Innovation System: A Historical Perspective, in ACCELERATING ENERGY
INNOVATION: INSIGHTS FROM MULTIPLE SECTORS 25, 27-28 (Rebecca M. Henderson &
Richard G. Newell eds., 2011).
109 DIETER HELM, THE CARBON CRUNCH: HOW WE’RE GETTING CLIMATE CHANGE
WRONG AND HOW TO FIX IT 94-99 (2012).
110 Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 5, at 441.
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may backfire in the long run by locking in long-lived natural gas
infrastructure, which could impede the development of renewables.111
If Congress were to devote a large sum of money to clean
technology innovation, the billion-dollar question would be who
should determine how that money will be spent and according to what
procedure. In this Part, we advocate for prediction markets as a key
component of this process.
The risk of incompetence and the dangers of special interest
influence lead many scholars to downplay the potential role for
Congress in allocating funds and to instead call for substantial
authority to be placed in the hands of administrative agencies advised
by experts.112 Congress could, for example, appropriate funds with a
broad delegation of authority to one or more agencies instructing
them to award grants to promote clean technology. In Section A, we
explain how a grant-making institution could incorporate prediction
markets to improve the grant selection process. In Section B, we
discuss the more radical possibility of incorporating prediction
markets at the congressional level. Section C addresses caveats and
criticisms.
Based on the theory and evidence outlined in Part I, prediction
markets are particularly useful when one or more of the following
conditions are met: (i) relevant information is widely dispersed and
those possessing it have little incentive (or perhaps even a
disincentive) to voluntarily reveal it to policymakers; (ii) powerful
groups have an incentive to spread misinformation; (iii) no single
forecasting model dominates; (iv) true experts are hard to identify or
may be subject to cognitive and emotional biases; (v) experts stand to
benefit financially or reputationally from their forecasts; and (vi)
policymakers will have difficulty correctly determining how much
weight to give to particular pieces of information.

111 AGHION ET AL., supra note 106, at 9-10. Natural gas-fired power plants are,
however, a good match for the growing share of renewables in the U.S. and global
electricity mix as their fast ramping capacity offers critical balancing services for
intermittent power production from solar and wind generators.
112 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 107, at 42-45 (advocating “technological inducement
prizes for climate-related innovations” with Congress to “identify, in broad terms, the
purposes for which prizes should be used,” while delegating the task of developing
specific prize proposals to expert panels overseen by agency administrators); Hahn,
Climate Policy, supra note 107, at 587-88 (acknowledging the “clear danger” that
climate R&D will become politicized and advocating for “giving respected agencies
such as the National Science Foundation considerable funding authority, and
encouraging or providing peer review”).
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All of these circumstances are present when it comes to predicting
the consequences of green subsidies, which makes it difficult for
policymakers to obtain reliable forecasts. Key technological
breakthroughs could stem from a variety of sources that are not
currently obvious even to elite scientists and engineers.113 In other
words, information is widely dispersed. Moreover, people with
information may be reluctant to reveal it. For example, employees at a
company developing novel carbon sequestration technology may
conclude that the technology will never become commercially viable,
but choose not to publicly reveal this belief for fear that their employer
will retaliate against them. Special interest groups have an incentive to
lobby for subsidies and even to procure and disseminate research that
may be biased in their favor.114 Experts may be biased due to
ideological commitments and reputational concerns. Some climate
scientists might be reluctant to discuss geoengineering for fear that
policymakers and the public may conclude that an easy and painless
solution to global warming will eventually present itself, offering a
rationale for inaction in the meantime.115 Others may be ideologically
opposed to solutions that emphasize nuclear energy.116 Even honest
and unbiased experts may disagree about whether the government
should, for example, focus its efforts on solar technology instead of
wind, in which case policymakers may have no way to determine
whom to believe. Prediction markets can help cut through the
complexity and misinformation by giving a diverse group of people an
incentive to truthfully and anonymously reveal what they know while
producing a confidence-weighted price that summarizes relevant
information.
A. Use of Prediction Markets by ARPA-E and Other Administrative
Agencies
In this section, we use the Department of Energy’s ARPA-E program
as a case study to explain how an administrative agency might use
prediction markets to improve the grant selection process.117 ARPA-E
113 See MCKINSEY & CO., “AND THE WINNER IS . . .”: CAPTURING THE PROMISE OF
PHILANTHROPIC PRIZES 23 (2009).
114 See, e.g., Mullins & Nicas, supra note 55 (reporting on efforts by Google to fund
academic research that allowed it to defend itself from antitrust regulation).
115 See Mark G. Lawrence, The Geoengineering Dilemma: To Speak or Not to Speak,
77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 245, 247 (2006).
116 See HELM, supra note 109, at 97; Hahn, Climate Policy, supra note 107, at 586.
117 We acknowledge that the government’s prior experience with prediction
markets has not been encouraging. In the early 2000s, the Defense Department
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began operating in 2009 with a mission to promote transformative
innovation in energy technology by funding high-risk, high-reward
research that would not otherwise be funded by the private sector.118
This mission includes the development of technologies to reduce
carbon emissions.119 Since its inception, ARPA-E has funded over $1.5
billion in research on more than 500 projects.120 In 2010, for example,
ARPA-E awarded $6 million to fund research related to energy kites —
airborne wind turbines intended to generate and deliver wind power
from an airborne platform.121
For our purposes, ARPA-E makes a nice case study because effective
climate change mitigation requires new and transformative energy
technologies. The prediction markets discussed in this section could,
however, easily be adapted to fit the missions and procedures of other
grant-making institutions and agencies.
1.

The Grant Selection Process

To understand how ARPA-E might incorporate prediction markets,
it is helpful to deconstruct the agency’s existing process for granting
awards. While the director of ARPA-E decides which projects
ultimately receive funding, he makes this determination in close
consultation with the agency’s program directors.122 In general,
program directors are top researchers who typically serve three-year
terms.123 These elite scientists come from positions in industry,
government, or academia, and usually return to one of these sectors
following their stint with ARPA-E.124
sponsored a project to develop prediction markets to predict military and political
stability around the world. The project was canceled for political reasons after certain
politicians and the media (falsely) alleged that the government planned to encourage
betting on terrorist attacks. Robin D. Hanson, Designing Real Terrorism Futures, 128
PUB. CHOICE 257, 258-63 (2006). We believe, however, that the prediction markets
that we propose would be much less controversial because the subject matter is not as
inflammatory.
118 42 U.S.C. § 16538(c)(1)-(2) (2018).
119 Id. § 16538(c)(1)(A)(ii).
120 Joseph S. Manser et al., ARPA-E: Accelerating U.S. Energy Innovation, 1 AM.
CHEMICAL SOC’Y ENERGY LETTERS 987, 987 (2016).
121 ARPA-E, ARPA-E: THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS: A SAMPLING OF PROJECT OUTCOMES 8384 (2016).
122 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., AN ASSESSMENT OF ARPA-E 38-39
(2017).
123 See William B. Bonvillian & Richard Van Atta, ARPA-E and DARPA: Applying the
DARPA Model to Energy Innovation, 36 J. TECH. TRANSFER 469, 485-86 (2011).
124 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 122, at 56.
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The ARPA-E funding process typically begins when a program
director pitches an idea for a new program that targets an area of
energy technology.125 Once a program is accepted, agency staff gather
information and solicit input from experts in the field to more
precisely determine the research focus.126 The process includes a
“constructive confrontation,” a debate about the program among all
ARPA-E program directors.127 If the agency’s director approves the
program, ARPA-E issues a funding opportunity announcement
(“FOA”) soliciting concept papers for research ideas pertaining to the
program.128
Once concept papers are received, ARPA-E sends them to external
reviewers who assign numerical scores.129 “A merit review board,
usually chaired by the program director who proposed the [program
in the first place], reviews and discusses the . . . papers.”130 The board
is not bound by the reviewers’ scores, and instead makes independent
recommendations to the ARPA-E director, who decides which
applicants will be asked to submit full applications.131 Full
applications must include well-defined outcomes and deliverables as
well as a project schedule that sets significant milestones.132 The full
applications then undergo another round of external reviews and
review by a merit review board.133 The ARPA-E director selects certain
applications to negotiate the terms of an award, including the level of
funding as well as specific and quantifiable project milestones.134
Ultimately, the agency selects about five percent of the concept papers
received for award negotiation.135
Projects typically receive funding for between six months and four
years and award amounts average $2.3 million, with some projects
receiving as much as $9.1 million.136 Throughout the project, ARPA-E
staff, including the program director, are in frequent contact with the
125

Id. at 32.
Id. at 34.
127 Id.
128 Id. ARPA-E also occasionally issues open-ended FOAs that request concept
papers on any potentially transformative energy technology. Id. at 35-36.
129 Id. at 37.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 38-39; Manser et al., supra note 120, at 988.
133 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 122, at 38-39.
134 Id. at 40-42.
135 Id. at 62. For review of projects that the agency has funded, see generally ARPAE, supra note 121.
136 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 122, at 68.
126
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research team.137 The program director periodically evaluates the
project to determine if it is meeting milestones. If not, milestones may
be modified, and, in some cases, funding for a project has been
canceled because the program director concluded that the research
team could not meet its objectives.138
2.

Concerns with ARPA-E’s Procedures

At Congress’s request, the National Academy of the Sciences
recently assessed the operations of ARPA-E. While the National
Academy’s report was largely positive, it also cautioned that it can take
many years (perhaps even decades) to determine whether early-stage
research of the type funded by ARPA-E will turn out to be
transformative.139 Consequently, empirical evidence to date is
insufficient to draw reliable conclusions regarding the agency’s success
in achieving its mission.140
The National Academy’s report notwithstanding, ARPA-E’s
procedures leave considerable room for improvement if the agency is
to serve as a model for allocating the large and high-stakes research
and development subsidies necessary to combat climate change. The
program’s funding decisions are controlled by a relatively small group
of government officials who rely heavily on group deliberation and
peer review. As we have discussed, these decision mechanisms, while
potentially helpful, also suffer from serious flaws.141 To their credit,
officials at ARPA-E have taken measures to mitigate potential
problems. ARPA-E is not bound by the scores that peer reviewers
assign to applications, and the evidence suggests that the agency does
not simply rubber stamp the applications that receive the highest
scores.142 In addition, ARPA-E encourages program directors to engage
in constructive criticism when deliberating whether an application
deserves funding.143
Nonetheless, we are not confident that these measures are sufficient
to fully address the substantial problems with peer review and group
deliberation. Moreover, they may introduce problems of their own.
For example, the discretion ARPA-E gives to program directors may,
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 126.
See supra Part I.
See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 122, at 63-67.
Id. at 52-53.

1456

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:1429

at least partially, correct for the biases of peer review. But the resulting
empowerment of program directors could prove counterproductive if
the directors themselves are biased or lack critical information. After
all, it is the directors who suggest the specific research programs in the
first place. Bias among program directors is also of concern because
many of them come from industry and return there after their
interlude at ARPA-E and because they are recruited from a relatively
close-knit professional community.144 Besides, ARPA-E’s culture
requires program directors “to exert religious zeal in advancing
selected technologies through the implementation stage.”145 Although
not definitive, the fact that “[s]ignificant variation in project outcomes
can be seen across ARPA-E programs”146 suggests that some directors
have been more successful than others.
Even if ARPA-E’s decision-making process was perfect, many
people, and particularly conservatives, will be skeptical of giving a
small group of bureaucrats and scientists discretion over the allocation
of large sums of taxpayer dollars. Despite the National Academy’s
overall positive report, the conservative Heritage Foundation has
argued that ARPA-E has been captured by various special interest
groups and that it wastes precious tax dollars by funding projects that
would otherwise be funded privately.147 Although the Government
Accountability Office investigated this claim and found “that most
ARPA-E-type projects could not be funded solely by private
investors,”148 the Trump administration has signaled that it may
attempt to eliminate ARPA-E’s funding.149
3.

A Prediction Market for Transformative Energy Projects

Prediction markets could complement the group deliberation and
peer review processes currently in place at ARPA-E and address some
144

See id. at 56.
Bonvillian & Van Atta, supra note 123, at 489.
146 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 122, at 103-04.
147 See HERITAGE FOUND., BLUEPRINT FOR BALANCE: A FEDERAL BUDGET FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2018, at 61 (2017).
148 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-112, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY:
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY-ENERGY COULD BENEFIT FROM INFORMATION ON
APPLICANTS’ PRIOR FUNDING 12-14 (2012).
149 See Christa Marshall, Fears Rise About ARPA-E’s Future Under Trump, E&E
NEWS: GREENWIRE (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060049535; Brad
Plumer, Scientists Praise Energy Innovation Office Trump Wants to Shut Down, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/climate/arpa-e-nationalacademy-sciences.html.
145
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of the concerns outlined above by forecasting the likelihood of success
of ARPA-E’s projects. They might also assuage the agency’s
conservative critics who tend to have more faith in markets as sources
of information than in scientists and bureaucrats.
Neither energy technologies nor agency procedures are easily
transformed overnight. Accordingly, we begin with a modest proposal
for incremental change to ARPA-E’s project selection process intended
to jumpstart experimentation with prediction markets. Imagine that
ARPA-E is considering applications received in response to an FOA for
projects related to efficient gasoline engine design.150 Program officials
could set up a prediction market for each application to forecast the
project’s likelihood of success. They would need to define exactly
what success means for each proposal and establish a date and metric
by which success or failure would be determined.151 One possibility
requiring little deviation from current practice would be to define
success as a determination made by ARPA-E at the end of the funding
period that the project has met its milestones. Given that milestones
are negotiated after an application is accepted and that these
milestones are sometimes revised during the project, traders would
implicitly have to predict what the milestones will be, but ARPA-E
decision makers currently do this when they select applications for
funding. Another possibility would be to have the market predict
whether a project will be canceled prior to completion for failure to
achieve its milestones.
Once success is defined, traders would bet on the outcome,
receiving $1 per contract if the project succeeds and nothing if it fails.
Bets would be conditioned on ARPA-E awarding the grant and would
be canceled otherwise.152 To avoid public disclosure of confidential
information contained in grant applications, officials could limit
participation in the market to ARPA-E employees and outside experts
who participate in the ARPA-E peer review process. To avoid running
afoul of gambling laws, the market could be based on play money with
winners receiving prizes and bragging rights. Alternatively, ARPA-E
could provide participants with an initial stake so that they are not
150 See, e.g., Efficient Engine Design, ARPA-E, https://arpa-e.energy.gov/?q=slicksheet-project/efficient-engine-design (last visited Nov. 14, 2018).
151 For prediction markets to function properly, outcomes must be clearly defined
and rules of adjudication stable. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note
62, at 120.
152 The unwinding approach to conditional prediction markets has proven
commercially feasible. MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS
FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING 142 (2007) [hereinafter PREDICTOCRACY].
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putting their own money at risk,153 or traders could participate in a
lottery offering prizes with raffle tickets allocated in proportion to
prediction accuracy.154
We admit that the experimental use of prediction markets we
propose here would have no more than a limited impact. The
underlying mechanism, however, has the potential to provide valuable
information to ARPA-E decision-makers. The clearing price for each
prediction market would aggregate the views of highly trained experts
to deliver a transparent and convenient forecast. The ability to trade
anonymously would further encourage truthful predictions and
mitigate some of the biases that afflict group deliberation and peer
review.
More importantly, smaller-scale experimentation with this type of
low-risk prediction market could pave the way for more ambitious
efforts going forward. Like any new tool in the administrative toolkit,
prediction markets must first prove themselves before they can
become a routine part of the policymaking process. Importantly,
ARPA-E could immediately implement the mechanism proposed here
at low cost and without the need for further enabling legislation. Once
officials recognize the value added by prediction markets, they can
resort (and defer) to them more often. In the long term,
experimentation can create an empirical track record that facilitates
ongoing improvements to prediction market design and
implementation.
4.

A Prediction Market for ARPA-E Programs

By limiting participation to a small group of experts and government
officials, our proposal for project prediction markets fails to unlock
the full potential of markets to aggregate widely dispersed information
and to amalgamate diverse viewpoints. The simplest way to address
this concern would be to open project prediction markets to the
public. Grant applications may, however, contain confidential
information and public disclosure could jeopardize an applicant’s
ability to patent inventions flowing from the grant. This might not
discourage all applications, but the concern is significant enough to
raise questions about the usefulness of this type of prediction market.

153 See Tom W. Bell, Government Prediction Markets: Why, Who, and How, 116 PA.
ST. L. REV. 403, 418 (2011).
154 Cf. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 44, at 117 (describing how Microsoft has
used markets of this type).
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An alternative approach would be for ARPA-E to set up prediction
markets to guide the allocation of large blocks of money. These
prediction markets would be open to the public and based on real
money. As discussed above, under current practice, ARPA-E
periodically identifies particular program areas worthy of grant
funding and then solicits specific project proposals. This process could
easily incorporate prediction markets to identify particularly
promising program areas. The agency could, for example, propose to
issue $50 million in grants related to carbon capture research.155
Prediction markets would then forecast whether the proposal would
likely succeed in reaching the agency’s pre-determined research
objective.
A few technical points are worth noting. The first relates to the
question of what outcome these prediction markets should focus on as
the measure of a proposal’s success. Ideally, the market would predict
whether the proposal would affect some comprehensive measure of
social welfare that might include economic productivity as measured
by GDP and other welfare indices designed to measure environmental
quality, health, and happiness.156 It will be difficult, however, to obtain
agreement on how to measure social welfare. Furthermore, even if
everyone agreed on the appropriate metric, in practice, the measure
would no doubt prove noisy so that only proposals expected to
generate very significant consequences would produce any measurable
effect.157 As a result, prediction markets might be of little use in
assessing less consequential proposals even if those proposals might
produce substantial net benefits in the long run or serve as stepping
stones for more transformative research.158
Program-level prediction markets could address this challenge
through more narrowly defined outcome measures.159 For proposals
155 Funding for focused technology programs typically ranges from thirty to fifty
million dollars and is allocated among five to fifteen projects. Manser et al., supra note
120, at 987.
156 Cf. Hanson, Bet on Beliefs, supra note 99, at 152 (arguing for the adoption of
policies that, according to prediction markets, would improve national welfare).
157 One way to deal with noisy predictions would be to use a prediction market to
predict the difference between prices in two other prediction markets, one of which is
conditioned on adoption of a policy and the other on failure to adopt. See
ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 203.
158 Nonetheless, even measures that are noisy can be useful for evaluation of
proposals. See Hanson, Bet on Beliefs, supra note 99, at 173-74.
159 Cf. id. at 171 (demonstrating the utility of “more focused welfare measures” by
noting how a stadium policy could have different impacts on national and regional
welfare).
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that focus on technologies designed to curb climate change, an
obvious option would be to forecast their effects on carbon emissions.
Even more narrowly, the markets could forecast intermediate metrics
of success such as citations to funded research in academic journals or
patent applications and the amount of follow-on funding that projects
will receive.
Notice, however, that as the focus moves from broader to narrower
measures of success, the relationship between the predicted outcome
(e.g., carbon emissions or journal citations) and the ultimate outcome
of interest (i.e., social welfare or environmental quality) becomes more
tenuous and less politically palatable. Some conservatives, for
instance, might object to markets that predict reductions in carbon
emissions because they question the link between emissions and
global warming.
The second technical point relates to the type of prediction market
used.160 A particularly promising approach would be for ARPA-E to
use prediction markets to obtain a probability distribution for various
values of the outcome of interest. For example, ARPA-E could issue
contracts paying $1 if the U.S. transportation sector’s carbon emissions
are between 2 and 2.1 billion metric tons in 2030, conditioned on the
government making a $100 million grant for research to develop a
more efficient gasoline engine. It could issue similar contracts for
emissions levels between 1.7 and 1.8 billion metric tons, 1.8 and 1.9
billion metric tons, and so forth. A similar set of markets could be
conditioned on the absence of the grant. Comparing the resulting
probability distributions for each set of markets would provide
information not only about the proposal’s expected effect on
emissions, but also about the uncertainty of those expectations.161
Alternatively, as we suggested in the Introduction, the government
could use prediction markets to predict the level of carbon emissions.
Under this approach, a contract could pay $1 for each 100 million
metric tons of emissions in the transportation sector in the year 2030.
If such a contract were selling for $20, its price would imply a forecast
of 2 billion metric tons. Again, ARPA-E could issue contracts
conditioned on a grant for gasoline engine research and on the
absence of the grant, and the difference in price would forecast the
effect of the grant.
160 In prediction market parlance, we are proposing a family of winner-take-all
contracts. For evidence that the approach we recommend can work, see Wolfers &
Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 114-15. For a discussion of other types
of prediction markets, see generally id. at 109-10.
161 See id. at 109-10.
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Finally, ARPA-E could obtain additional information by varying the
contingency on which a market is conditioned. It could, for example,
establish prediction markets to forecast the effects of allotting money
for carbon capture research conditioned on various levels of
investment, e.g., $50 million, $100 million, or $150 million. These
markets would provide guidance on the optimal amount of funding
and its allocation.
B. Use of Prediction Markets by Congress
Thus far, we have proposed the use of prediction markets by a
grant-making institution either to forecast the outcome of projects or
to determine the research areas to which funds should be allocated. A
potential criticism of our proposals is that they assume that grants are
the best way to encourage clean technology innovation. Perhaps tax
dollars would be better spent on technology inducement prizes or
funding a clean technology research and development tax credit. It is a
testament to the versatility of prediction markets that they can also
help inform the choice among these competing policy options. To
illustrate, Congress could set aside $10 billion to fund clean
technology research. It could draft specific proposals to distribute the
money via prizes or grants made by grant-making institutions or to
use it to fund a clean technology R&D tax credit.162 Prediction
markets could then forecast the effects of these proposals on carbon
emissions or another outcome of interest. In fact, multiple market
predictions could be combined to determine the optimal mix of
policies.
C. Caveats and Criticisms
Any proposal as daring and far-reaching in its consequences as the
use of prediction markets to guide climate policy will inevitably elicit
criticism. This section addresses potential criticisms and adds some
important caveats.

162 For a discussion of the various ways in which the government could subsidize
clean energy, see generally David Popp, Innovation and Climate Policy, 2 ANN. REV.
RESOURCE ECON. 275 (2010). Michael Abramowicz has suggested to us the intriguing
possibility that the government could use ex post subsidies as an alternative to
prediction markets in some instances. The government would announce that it plans
to pay out in the future some amount of subsidy for clean technology and then private
capital markets would direct investment toward technologies that investors believe the
government would likely reward.
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Market Manipulation and Trader Biases

Perhaps the most obvious concern with using prediction markets to
guide public policy is that parties with a financial interest in a policy
might bet heavily on their favored outcome to manipulate the result.
Some of the markets that we have proposed would not be open to the
public. Participation would be limited to a few experts and
government officials and the dollar amounts involved would be small
so that manipulation should not be a major problem. But limiting
participation comes at the cost of losing potentially valuable input
from those unable to participate. On the other hand, manipulation is a
critical concern for any market open to the public. Coal companies,
for example, might bet in a way that steers subsidies toward carbon
capture research, not because they consider carbon capture to be a
sound investment, but because they stand to gain if the subsidies pay
off, and they will not bear the full cost of failure.
The only way to determine whether the risk of manipulation is a
fatal flaw is through experimentation. The limited evidence to date
suggests that sustained manipulation of prediction market prices is
difficult, albeit perhaps not impossible.163 There are, however, reasons
for optimism. By trading based on something other than the estimated
value of the underlying contract, would-be manipulators function as
noise traders. Noise traders effectively subsidize speculative markets
by providing profit opportunities to traders who are better informed
about fundamental values. In particular, arbitrageurs can profit from
manipulators by taking their bets, thereby foiling their attempts at
manipulation. Paradoxically, manipulators can even make prediction
markets more accurate by giving better informed traders an extra
incentive to participate.164
In addition, the risk posed by manipulation depends on the
circumstances.165 In markets where trader forecasts are based on
163 For recent reviews of the literature, see generally Joyce E. Berg & Thomas A.
Rietz, Market Design, Manipulation, and Accuracy in Political Prediction Markets:
Lessons from the Iowa Electronic Markets, 47 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 293 (2014); Cary
Deck et al., Affecting Policy by Manipulating Prediction Markets: Experimental Evidence,
85 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 48, 49-50 (2013); Simon Kloker & Tobias T. Kranz,
Manipulation in Prediction Markets: Chasing the Fraudsters (June 10, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2017_rip/47/.
164 See Robin Hanson & Ryan Oprea, A Manipulator Can Aid Prediction Market
Accuracy, 76 ECONOMICA 304, 305 (2009).
165 For conditional prediction markets, the expected cost of manipulation decreases
with the likelihood that the condition will be met. See Lionel Page, The Ability of
Markets to Predict Conditional Probabilities: Evidence from the U.S. Presidential
Campaign, in PREDICTION MARKETS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS supra note 63, at 123,
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publicly available information and traders do not have private
information bearing on the outcome of interest, manipulation should
be less of a problem because an arbitrageur has no reason to believe
that recent trades are based on information that she herself does not
possess. As a result, she will be more likely to make trades that correct
the market price. Moreover, even where some traders have private
information, other traders may be able to counteract manipulation
attempts if they know that incentives for manipulation exist.166
A related concern is that traders might suffer from biases that could
affect the market price.167 But here again there is cause for optimism.
Studies of election prediction markets have found that those markets
make remarkably accurate predictions even though traders are not
representative of voters generally and many traders suffer from
numerous biases, including excessively optimistic expectations of their
preferred candidates.168 These markets function well because, at the
margin, the market price is determined by a small but well-informed
and less biased group of active traders who profit by taking advantage
of the partisans.169 Unlike group deliberation or polls in which
numbers matter most, a small number of informed and confident
traders can drive outcomes in prediction markets.
2.

Thin Markets

A market with little trading activity might not produce a reliable
price signal.170 Thin, illiquid markets could be a problem particularly
when the government creates multiple, related prediction markets on
the same topic.

135. In the policy context, manipulation might be a problem for advisory markets
where traders believe that the policy is unlikely to be adopted.
166 See Robin Hanson et al., Information Aggregation and Manipulation in an
Experimental Market, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 449, 458 (2006).
167 See, e.g., William N. Goetzmann & Massimo Massa, Daily Momentum and
Contrarian Behavior of Index Fund Investors, 37 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 375,
379-81 (2002) (finding evidence of biased behavior among investors in a stock index
fund).
168 Berg et al., Results, supra note 79, at 742-49.
169 See id. at 749.
170 See Ledyard, supra note 62, at 61. Note, however, that empirical evidence
suggests that even thin markets can sometimes perform well. See Wolfers & Zitzewitz,
Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 113-14. Moreover, prediction market technicians
have developed mechanisms for producing accurate predictions even in thin markets.
See, e.g., Robin Hanson, Combinatorial Information Market Design, 5 INFO. SYS.
FRONTIERS 107, 117-18 (2003).
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When markets are limited to a small group of bureaucrats and
experts, the government can improve market trading and liquidity by
offering participants an incentive to trade, e.g., by giving them money
with which to make bets or by offering prizes. Public prediction
markets, on the other hand, should generate sufficient trading
spontaneously so long as traders believe that the markets might
actually influence policy. If the market related to a policy proposal is
thin, interested parties could manipulate it by betting on their
preferred outcome. In doing so, they would then become noise
traders, and speculators could make money by betting against them in
a self-reinforcing process that thickens the market.171 Even if noise
traders fail to materialize, the government can simply subsidize the
market directly, e.g., by making random trades and thereby
functioning as a noise trader or by subsidizing an automated market
maker.172 Another way to encourage market activity is to increase the
importance of prediction markets by putting them directly in charge of
decisions,173 a possibility that we discuss in more detail below.
3.

The Risks (and Benefits) of Insider Trading

Unlike stock markets, prediction markets aim to provide
information. Therefore, insider trading can be a feature rather than a
bug.174 If prediction markets are open to the public and based on real
money, then people who have inside information or a direct financial
interest in the outcome should generally be allowed to trade along
with government officials, as long as their ability to do so is well
publicized.175 The main concern here is that insider trading will
discourage others from participating because they assume that insiders
know more and will take advantage of them.176 But that risk will be
minimal in the public prediction markets that we contemplate because
relevant information is likely to be widely dispersed. Insiders may
have some additional information, but the information asymmetry
171

Hanson, Bet on Beliefs, supra note 99, at 168.
See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 121; Robin Hanson,
Prediction Markets “Fail” To Mooch, OVERCOMING BIAS (July 19, 2012, 12:00 AM),
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2012/07/prediction-markets-fail-to-mooch.html.
173 See ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 211-13.
174 Cf. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (arguing
that permitting insider trading with respect to stocks would promote efficiency by
ensuring that stock prices incorporate private information).
175 Cf. Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 54-55 (“[W]e would suggest that there
should be a presumption against ever limiting participation in markets.”).
176 Id. at 55.
172
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should not be severe. To the extent information asymmetry is
significant for a given market, Robin Hanson has proposed a
mechanism for dealing with it. Insiders would be allowed to trade, but
their trades would be disclosed in advance.177 As a last resort, if there
is a risk that arbitrageurs cannot overcome the risk of manipulation by
insiders, then a ban on insider trading might be appropriate, though it
may impair market accuracy.
4.

Correlation Is Not the Same as Causation

If conditional prediction markets are advisory rather than binding,
then policymakers must be careful not to confuse correlation with
causation.178 To illustrate the potential problem, consider a scenario
where prediction market prices suggest that future carbon emissions
will be substantially lower if the government heavily subsidizes carbon
capture technology. Unfortunately, policymakers cannot simply
conclude that traders believe that increasing the carbon capture
subsidy will cause the reduction in emissions.
If the government has private, policy-relevant information, then
traders will try to account for this information asymmetry in their
forecasts.179 Specifically, traders may conclude that policymakers will
increase the carbon capture subsidy only if policymakers have
information that supports doing so. In that case, the market’s
prediction of future emissions conditioned on the subsidy may be
biased downward to reflect the fact that the subsidy will occur only
under favorable circumstances. Note, however, that this problem only
arises if traders believe that policymakers have important private
information, which will not always be the case. In any event, the
government can mitigate this problem by allowing insiders with the
same private information to participate in the market.180 Another
approach would be to place the decision in the hands of someone
without private information, in which case that person would rely
solely on the prediction market along with publicly disclosed expert
reports.181 Those with private information could still influence the

177 Robin Hanson, Decision Markets for Policy Advice, in PROMOTING THE GENERAL
WELFARE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 151, 172 n.20 (Alan S.
Gerber & Eric M. Patashnik, eds., 2006).
178 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 123-24.
179 See Hanson, Bet on Beliefs, supra note 99, at 162; Page, supra note 165, at 133-34.
180 See Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 102, at 254-55; Hanson, Bet on Beliefs, supra
note 99, at 162.
181 ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 207.
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decision by trading in the market or publicizing what they know for
the benefit of the decision-maker. In addition, traders should be
informed that the decision to adopt or reject the policy will be made
during a short decision window preferably in the near future.182 This
will allay fears that new information might come to light before the
market closes.
Even if the government has no private information bearing on a
policy’s likelihood of success, the adoption of the policy in question
may still correlate with a change in the outcome of interest without
being the sole cause of that change. For instance, traders may
conclude that the government will increase the carbon capture subsidy
only if the president decides to prioritize climate policy, a decision
that would entail adoption of numerous complementary policies. In
that case, the market may predict that emissions will fall if the carbon
capture subsidy increases, but only because traders expect the overall
package of climate policies to be effective, not necessarily because they
believe that carbon capture itself will succeed.
In the abstract, this latter problem presents a significant challenge to
the use of advisory prediction markets. But if, as should often be the
case, policymakers have no reason to suspect problems of reverse
causation or omitted variable bias,183 they can more confidently rely
on prediction market forecasts. Moreover, prediction market
technicians have developed sophisticated methods for disentangling
correlation and causation.184 Due to space constraints, we will not
discuss these methods in detail. Suffice it to say that the problem of
using prediction markets to draw conclusions about causation strikes
us as no more daunting than the many challenges facing conventional
decision-making mechanisms.

182

See id.
Omitted variable bias may occur when a variable is omitted from a statistical
analysis and that variable is correlated with the independent variable and an included
dependent variable. SCOTT W. MENARD, LOGISTIC REGRESSION: FROM INTRODUCTORY TO
ADVANCED CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 107 (2010).
184 See, e.g., Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 47-50 (recommending the use of
instrumental variables); Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at
122-24 (discussing the use of contingent contracts); Robin Hanson, Shock Response
Futures, OVERCOMING BIAS (May 31, 2007, 6:00 AM), http://www.overcomingbias.
com/2007/05/shock_response_.html (proposing shock response futures); see generally
Eric Snowberg et al., How Prediction Markets Can Save Event Studies, in PREDICTION
MARKETS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 63, at 18, 27-30 (discussing how
incorporating prediction markets into event studies can facilitate causal inferences).
183
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The simplest way to cope with the correlation-versus-causation
problem would be to put decision markets directly in charge.185 For
example, the government could announce in advance that if prediction
markets predict that $100 million in grants for carbon capture
research will reduce emissions by x amount in 2030, then it will fund
the grants.186
We recognize that self-deciding prediction markets of this type
constitute a significant departure from current practice. We do not
recommend them for important decisions absent further
experimentation and a strong empirical record of success. Having said
that, increased reliance on prediction markets might not be as risky as
it seems. Currently, group deliberation, peer review, and cost-benefit
analysis, despite their well-documented flaws, play a substantial role
in policymaking, particularly within administrative agencies.
Moreover, even if self-deciding prediction markets would occasionally
make grave mistakes, these markets might, on balance, still improve
on current institutions, which many argue frequently produce very
costly errors.
Importantly, self-deciding prediction markets would not rule out the
use of expert reports and committees or even cost-benefit analysis. In
fact, experts could provide valuable information to traders. The real
innovation of a self-deciding prediction market is that the market itself
would serve as the decision maker rather than an individual or
committee. The novelty of this approach provides good reason for
caution. But neither theory nor empirical evidence supports an a priori
claim that individuals or deliberating groups will always or usually
make better policy decisions than prediction markets.
5.

Longshot Bias

Numerous studies have found that sports gamblers bet excessively
on longshots.187 This could be because they enjoy taking risks or
because they overestimate the likelihood of low-probability events.188
185 See ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 211; Hanson, Bet on Beliefs,
supra note 99, at 162.
186 Because of the risk of brief price spikes, the government would likely not want
to focus on the price at any given time, but instead average transaction prices over a
longer period. See Abramowicz, Information Markets, supra note 102, at 946.
187 E.g., Oikonomidis & Johnson, supra note 63, at 207-08 (reviewing the evidence
related to soccer betting).
188 Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers, Explaining the Favorite–Longshot Bias: Is It
Risk-Love or Misperceptions?, 118 J. POL. ECON. 723, 743-44 (2010) (finding evidence
of the latter).
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Evidence suggests that this longshot bias also has some effect on
prediction markets in that extremely unlikely outcomes are
overpriced, especially in thin markets.189 If transaction costs are low,
however, arbitrageurs should be able to minimize the damage by
taking advantage of biased participants.190 Moreover, longshot bias
would not be a problem in prediction markets for climate policy
unless the government adopted policies that markets suggested had an
extremely low probability of success.
6.

Asset Bubbles

Some economists believe that speculative markets are prone to
bubbles during which assets are overvalued for a sustained period.191
This hypothesis is controversial and difficult to prove. But even if
bubbles do occur, we have reason to believe that they will not affect
prediction markets to the same degree as other speculative markets.
First, in some speculative markets, bubbles may occur because
investors who recognize that a bubble exists do not know exactly
when it will burst and are unable or unwilling to put significant capital
at risk until the market corrects itself.192 In prediction markets,
however, the amounts involved are often small enough that capital
constraints should not influence traders’ bets.193 Moreover, when a
prediction market is open for only a short period, that reduces the risk
of a prolonged bubble and facilitates arbitrage.194
Second, stock market bubbles may occur because many investors
follow trends so that if the market has been increasing, many assume
it will continue to increase and buy accordingly, creating a selffulfilling prophecy that ultimately proves unsustainable.195 Most
prediction markets, however, should not suffer from this problem
189

See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 117-18.
The government should set up prediction markets to facilitate arbitrage
opportunities. See Richard Borghesi, Price Biases and Contract Design: Lessons from
Tradesports, in PREDICTION MARKETS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 63, at 96,
105-08 (providing evidence from football prediction markets that properly designed
contracts facilitate arbitrage and increase efficiency).
191 See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance,
17 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 96-101 (2003).
192 See J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 703, 704-06 (1990); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of
Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 36-37 (1997).
193 Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 118.
194 ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 222-23.
195 See Goetzmann & Massa, supra note 167, at 378-88 (discussing the influence of
momentum traders on the stock market).
190
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because they cannot move in the same direction indefinitely.196 For
example, the probability that an ARPA-E project will succeed can
never exceed 100%.
Finally, in some speculative markets, bubbles may occur because of
constraints on short selling.197 But in prediction markets, there are no
constraints on short selling, and there are even mechanisms that
substitute for short selling.198
Despite these reasons for optimism, the only way to determine
whether the prediction markets that we propose are prone to bubbles
is through experimentation. Even if bubbles do occur on occasion, the
question is whether other forecasting mechanisms consistently
perform better. Empirical evidence to date is encouraging: while
prediction markets are subject to bubbles, the problem has not proven
to be widespread or significant.199
7.

Time Discounting

Some of the prediction markets that we envision would have long
time horizons because the outcomes of interest would not occur until
years (maybe even decades) into the future. Long time horizons can be
problematic because during the time they hold contracts, traders forgo
the return that they would otherwise earn on any invested funds. As a
result, people become less willing to participate in the market, and the
market price is distorted, reducing the market’s ability to yield useful
information.200 Fortunately, market operators can overcome this
problem by allowing traders to put their money in a self-directed
investment fund so that they can assemble the portfolio of their
choice, making them indifferent between investing in prediction
markets or more traditional markets.201 Moreover, prediction markets

196

See ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 218-19.
See Shiller, supra note 191, at 98-100.
198 See ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 223; Wolfers & Zitzewitz,
Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 118. For empirical evidence that short selling
increases prediction market accuracy, see generally Florian Teschner et al., ShortSelling in Prediction Markets, 5 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no.2, 2011, at 14.
199 See, e.g., Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 118-19.
200 See Werner Antweiler, Long-Term Prediction Markets, 6 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no.
3, 2012, at 43, 60; Lionel Page & Robert T. Clemen, Do Prediction Markets Produce
Well-Calibrated Probability Forecasts?, 123 ECON. J. 491, 510-11 (2012).
201 Antweiler, supra note 200, at 58-59. For commercial prediction markets,
investors might be concerned about the risk of bankruptcy or of adverse regulatory
actions. See id. at 60. But for our proposal, these concerns are less significant because
the markets in question would be government sanctioned.
197
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for climate policy do not have to be perfectly efficient to yield useful
information, particularly if the contract price suggests that a policy
will have significant effects.202 Under those circumstances,
policymakers would benefit from the market’s forecast even if the
contract price was somewhat distorted.
8.

Legal Concerns

We have recommended some prediction markets that would involve
real money and be open to the public. A major impediment to these
markets is that they may run afoul of state gambling laws or could be
subject to stifling federal regulation as commodities futures markets.203
We agree with others who have argued that government-sponsored
prediction markets should not be subject to these restrictive laws,204
but we also acknowledge that some of the prediction markets that we
propose probably cannot legally operate without changes to existing
regulations and perhaps even legislation. Having said that, legal
concerns pose less of an obstacle to prediction markets such as those
we suggest for ARPA-E, in which participation would be limited to
government employees and consultants using play money or where
the government supplies each participant with an initial stake in
exchange for an obligation to trade.205
III. PREDICTION MARKETS TO INFORM STATE CLIMATE POLICIES
In the absence of comprehensive federal action to address climate
change and promote clean energy, states are increasingly stepping in
to fill the policy void.206 Forty-five states and the District of Columbia
have implemented net-metering policies that enable utility customers
with solar and other distributed generation assets to effectively run
their electricity meter backwards and be compensated for any power
produced in excess of the customer’s power consumption from the

202 Cf. Vandenbergh et al., supra note 11, at 2006 (making a similar point with
respect to prediction markets in general).
203 For a discussion of the legal concerns surrounding real-money prediction
markets, see Bell, supra note 153, at 417-25.
204 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow et al., The Promise of Prediction Markets, 320 SCI.
877, 877-78 (2008); Bell, supra note 153, at 424-25.
205 See Bell, supra note 153, at 428.
206 For an overview of state climate policy action, see Engel & Orbach, supra note
13; Farber, supra note 13; Stewart, supra note 13; see also Mormann, Clean Energy
Federalism, supra note 13 (exploring the ideal institutional level of implementation for
select climate and clean energy policies).
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grid.207 Twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S.
territories have adopted renewable portfolio standards208 that create
markets for low-carbon, renewable energy by requiring electric
utilities to source a portion of their sales from solar, wind, and other
low-carbon renewables.209 A few pioneering states, meanwhile, have
recently begun to experiment with feed-in tariff210 policies that pay
eligible generators above-market rates designed to cover the higher
generation costs of emerging climate-friendly energy technologies.211
Every one of these state climate policies could benefit from
prediction markets. Subtle differences in design and implementation
notwithstanding, they all require policymakers and regulators to
forecast some aspect of the future. As price-based policy tools,212 feedin tariffs require policymakers to anticipate the pace of technology
learning and cost improvements over time to set and maintain

207 Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electric Grid:
Distributed Generation and Net Metering, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 46-47 (2017).
208 Renewable portfolio standards, also known as a renewable targets or quota
obligations, set quotas that require electric utility companies to source a certain share
of the electricity they sell to end-users from renewable sources of energy. See infra Part
III.B.
209 See NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. & DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARD POLICIES (2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/B73L-ZKTT].
Eight more states and one U.S. territory have adopted nonbinding goals for the
deployment of renewables. See id. For a discussion of the history and political
background of state renewable portfolio standards, see Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The
Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y 10 (2007). For more information on the design and implementation
characteristics of renewable portfolio standards, see infra Part III.B.
210 Feed-in tariffs are two-pronged policies that guarantee renewable power
generators access to their local power grid and require local electric utilities to purchase
the power output of these generators at above-market rates. See infra Part III.A. The
policy’s misleading name — it does not impose any tariff on electricity imports or other
related activities — is thought to be a tribute to an overly literal translation of its
implementation in Germany as per the 1991 Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (Electricity Feedin Law). See Paul Gipe, Frequently Asked Questions about Feed-in Tariffs, Advanced
Renewable Tariffs, and Renewable Energy Payments, WIND-WORKS.ORG, http://www.windworks.org/cms/index.php?id=211#c930 [https://perma.cc/S3HA-DECB].
211 Early adopters of feed-in tariffs at the state level include California, Hawaii,
Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See infra notes 215–21 and
accompanying text. For more information on the design and implementation
characteristics of feed-in tariffs, see infra Part III.A.
212 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES: PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE
POLICIES 92-93 (2008) [hereinafter DEPLOYING RENEWABLES] (explaining the
dichotomy of price- and quantity-based policy tools to promote low-carbon renewable
energy generation technologies).
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appropriate tariff rates that offer sufficient but not excessive
remuneration for eligible technologies. Quantity-based policies such as
renewable portfolio standards let the market determine the level of
remuneration but require policymakers to forecast the amount of
solar, wind, and other intermittent renewables that the grid will be
able to absorb without jeopardizing the reliability of electric service.
Recent controversies over the equity implications of net metering and
calls for higher grid usage fees to end alleged cross-subsidization213 ask
policymakers to assess and weigh the present as well as future costs
and benefits of low-carbon distributed power generation. Finally, all of
these, and many other, climate policies require policymakers to
forecast the potential of specific clean energy technologies to help
mitigate global warming and climate change.
A. Feed-in Tariffs: What Rate Is Right?
Feed-in tariffs have historically been popular among European
countries including Denmark, Germany, Portugal, and Spain.214 In the
United States, a growing number of pioneering states have recently
adopted feed-in tariff programs to promote renewables, including
California,215 Hawaii,216 Maine,217 Oregon,218 Rhode Island,219
Vermont,220 and Washington.221
213 See, e.g., Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 129-47 (2014–2015) (discussing the public debate over the
“fairness” of net metering policies).
214 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES, supra note 212, at 17. For
further background, see generally David Grinlinton & LeRoy Paddock, The Role of
Feed-in Tariffs in Supporting the Expansion of Solar Energy Production, 41 U. TOL. L.
REV. 943, 949-52 (2010). More recently, many jurisdictions outside of Europe have
adopted feed-in tariffs to promote renewable energy, including the Canadian province
of Ontario, South Africa, Kenya, the Indian states of West Bengal, Rajasthan, Gujarat,
and Punjab, as well as Australia’s Capital Territory, New South Wales, and South
Australia. See MIGUEL MENDONÇA ET AL., POWERING THE GREEN ECONOMY: THE FEED-IN
TARIFF HANDBOOK 90, 97-100, 102-08 (2010).
215 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.20 (2018).
216 See Stipulation for Protective Order at 1, Public Utilities Commission of Haw.
(2009) (No. 2008-0273), https://perma.cc/E835-EVXC.
217 See ME. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 3603 (2015).
218 See OR. REV. STAT. § 757.365 (2016); Order 10-198 Establishing Pilot Program,
Public Utility Commission of Oregon (2010); Order 10-200 Adopting New Rules, A
Rulemaking Regarding Solar Photovoltaic Energy Systems (2010); Order 11-339
Modifying Pilot Program, Public Utility Commission of Oregon (2011).
219 See 39 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 39-26.1, 39-26.2 (2016).
220 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 8005a (2018).
221 See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-273 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 82.16.110
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Structurally, feed-in tariffs are best understood as two-pronged
policy instruments.222 The “feed-in” prong guarantees renewable
power generators access to the electric grid to ensure viable sales and
distribution channels for their power output. The “tariff” prong
requires local electric utilities to purchase the electricity output of
these generators at above-market rates that are designed to cover the
generator’s cost and offer a reasonable return on investment.223 Tariffs
can be set as a fixed total price for electricity from renewables, a
premium to be paid in addition to the market price, or a percentage of
retail rates.224 Like portfolio standards and net metering policies, feedin tariff policies allow electric utilities to pass the costs of premium
payments for low-carbon renewable energy on to their ratepayers.225
Feed-in tariffs are usually technology-specific, offering different tariff
rates for different strands of renewable energy technologies based on
their respective technological maturity and generation costs.226 In
addition, feed-in tariff design can be size-sensitive to account for the
different cost structures of utility-scale and distributed generation.227
While renewable portfolio standards let the market determine
trading prices for renewable energy credits and, hence, the overall
(2011).
222 See Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs to Meet U.S.
Renewable Electricity Targets, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 73, 73 (2007). For a detailed
description of the various feed-in tariff design elements, see MENDONÇA ET AL., supra
note 214, at 15-38.
223 The first-ever feed-in tariff in the United States, implemented by the
municipality of Gainesville, Florida, was designed to offer a return on investment of
five to six percent. See KARLYNN CORY ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TP-6A245549, FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS
9 (2009), https://perma.cc/XSE7-EX5Z. The duration of the utility’s purchase
obligation under a feed-in tariff ranges from eight years in Spain to fifteen years in
France to twenty years in Germany. Dominique Finon, Pros and Cons of Alternative
Policies Aimed at Promoting Renewables, 12 EUR. INV. BANK PAPERS, supra note 1, at 115.
224 The second option is sometimes referred to as a “feed-in premium” or
“premium feed-in tariff.” See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 214, at 40. For an example
of the retail rate percentage option, see Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff, Comparison of
Feed-in Tariff, Quota and Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development, 33
RENEWABLE ENERGY 1854, 1855 (2008). This Article generally refers to all of these
options uniformly as feed-in tariffs.
225 See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 214, at 29.
226 See id. at 26. For an example of cost reductions through technology learning in
solar photovoltaics and onshore wind energy, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE
CHANGE MITIGATION: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 12-13 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds.,
2011) [hereinafter RENEWABLE ENERGY].
227 See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 214, at 26-27.
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value of renewable electricity, feed-in tariffs require regulators to set
tariff rates.228 A tariff set too low will fail to attract the necessary
investment to deploy renewable energy technologies, as the example
of Argentina illustrates. In response to political opposition, Argentina’s
2006 feed-in tariff for wind energy was set too low to leverage any
investment, with deployed wind capacity stagnant at only thirty
megawatts nationwide — the equivalent of thirteen present-day
onshore wind turbines.229 In the United States, the city of Palo Alto,
California experienced similar issues when its solar feed-in tariff rates
failed to incentivize any deployment during the first three years
following its adoption in 2012.230
At the other end of the spectrum, a tariff set too high will impose
undue hardship on electricity ratepayers and undermines public
support for renewables, as evidenced by Spain’s feed-in tariff for solar
photovoltaics. The Spanish regulators chose to adopt rates similar to
Germany’s (then) widely praised feed-in tariff only to learn that, in
real terms, these rates were far too high given sunny Spain’s sixty
percent greater insolation compared to cloudy Germany.231 The
Spanish policymakers’ mishap delivered sizeable windfall profits to
solar power investors while imposing considerable costs on the
country’s ratepayers, eroding the public’s support for renewables and
eventually forcing the Spanish government to suspend its feed-in tariff
program.232
Even when policymakers get the initial feed-in tariff rate right,
vigilant regulatory oversight and frequent adjustments are needed to
ensure that tariff rates keep up with cost improvements in renewable
energy technologies. Growth in deployed capacity enables technology
learning that, in turn, reduces generation costs and moves low-carbon
renewable energy technologies closer to grid parity.233 Along the way,
228

See id. at 19.
See id. at 57.
230 Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 13, at 1661.
231 See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 214, at 58-59.
232 See The Government Will Temporarily Suspend Premiums for New Special Regime
Facilities, MINISTRY INDUSTRY, ENERGY, & TOURISM (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.minetur.
gob.es/en-US/GabinetePrensa/NotasPrensa/2012/Paginas/npregimenespecial270112.aspx
(last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (Spain).
233 Technology learning and cost-reduction varies by technology dependent upon
the level of market maturity. Solar photovoltaics, for instance, has historically
experienced cost reductions of twenty-two percent for every doubling of capacity. The
cost of onshore wind energy facilities has come down by ten percent for every
doubling of capacity. PATRICK HEARPS & DYLAN MCCONNELL, RENEWABLE ENERGY
TECHNOLOGY COST REVIEW 15, 26 (2011).
229
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feed-in tariffs require constant monitoring and modification to keep
investor returns reasonable and avoid windfalls from tariffs that, for
example, fail to fall along with tumbling prices for solar panels.234
State-level feed-in tariffs in the United States, such as that of
Oregon, give testament to the considerable demands that these
policies place on policymakers and regulators in their quest to set, and
maintain, appropriate tariff levels. Oregon’s solar feed-in tariff,235 also
known as the Oregon Solar Photovoltaic Volumetric Incentive
Program, launched on July 1, 2010, offering tariff rates of up to $0.65
per kilowatt-hour of solar-generated electricity.236 The program was
soon criticized for setting rates that were much too high, offering
windfall profits to developers.237 During initial enrollment rounds,
available capacity was, indeed, oversubscribed within a matter of
minutes, leading the Oregon Public Utility Commission to eventually
convert capacity allocation from a first-come-first-served system to a
lottery.238
To be fair, the regulators in charge of setting Oregon’s feed-in tariff
rates were given a tall task. Anticipating the real-world cost of solar
and other low-carbon renewable energy generation projects and,
hence, the level of remuneration that would cover these costs, while
also offering a reasonable return — neither excessive nor insufficient
— on the developer’s investment is a complex undertaking. The magic
number, often described as the levelized cost of electricity,239 depends
on a variety of factors, each subject to frequent and sometimes drastic
234 See Felix Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Renewable
Energy Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 97
(2016) [hereinafter A Tale of Three Markets] (describing German policymakers’
struggle to adjust the country’s feed-in tariffs in response to rapid cost improvements
for solar photovoltaic equipment).
235 See supra note 218.
236 See OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N., SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC VOLUMETRIC INCENTIVE
PROGRAM: REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 2-3 (2013).
237 See Pub. Util. Comm’n of Or., Solar Voltaic Comments and Regulations, UM
1505, at 3 (2011) (statement of Dave Sullivan) (“The incentive rates were at least
thirty percent too high to balance available capacity with demand.”).
238 Cf. id. at 4-5 (discussing a lottery system as a potential solution to the program’s
problems); OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 236, at 15 (stating that for three
enrollment periods, the program reached capacity in minutes).
239 The levelized cost of electricity metric represents the cost per kilowatt-hour of
electricity generated based on a power plant’s capital costs, fuel costs, fixed and
variable costs for operation and maintenance, and financing costs over the operational
life of the plant. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED
COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018, at 1
(2018), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf.
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changes. The cost of solar panels, inverters, and other hardware, for
example, has experienced a series of dramatic price drops over the past
decade.240 Soft costs, such as those incurred for permitting, installation
labor, and capital, are subject to similar fluctuations, yet account for
an ever-increasing share of overall project cost.241 Finally, Oregon’s
regulators also had to consider site-specific factors like the variations
in solar resource quality across different areas of their state.242
The vast amount of information required to set and maintain
appropriate feed-in tariff rates illustrates the enormous potential for
prediction markets to improve policy outcomes. Current practice
requires public utility commissions, who often lack the necessary
resources and expertise, to anticipate changes in solar panel prices,
installation costs, lending rates, and other key inputs. Prediction
markets offer a platform to aggregate pertinent information from
industry experts, including manufacturers, installers, financiers and
developers. Their “best guess” as to the levelized cost of solar
electricity from, say, a residential rooftop facility in Portland six
months from today, is likely to be considerably more accurate than
that of even the most diligent utility commission. As discussed above,
prediction markets could be structured to yield a probability
distribution of the expected cost to help policymakers better
understand the range of cost scenarios and their respective likelihood.
As relevant information is widely disbursed, feed-in tariff prediction
markets would function best if open to the public.
It is worth noting that the regulators in charge of Oregon’s feed-in
tariff program anticipated that they might err in setting tariff rates at
the outset of the program. To address the problem, they incorporated
an automatic rate adjustment mechanism, allowing tariff rates to rise
or fall from one enrollment round to the next.243 When demand far
exceeds available capacity, the mechanism reduces the rate for the
following round and, conversely, raises it if an enrollment round is
240 See, e.g., RAN FU ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TP-6A20-68925, U.S.
SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEM COST BENCHMARK: Q1 2017 vi (2017) (reporting cost
declines of approximately thirty percent for utility-scale solar systems from 2016 to
2017).
241 See id. at vi, viii (reporting soft costs as accounting for sixty-eight percent of
overall costs in residential solar projects). For an introduction to soft costs and the
factors driving them, see generally Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of
Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L. 681, 704-10 (2012).
242 As a tribute to regional variations in insolation, Oregon’s feed-in tariff program
divides the state into four different zones, each with its own rate. See OR. PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N., supra note 236, 6-7 (2013).
243 See id. at 6.
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undersubscribed, originally in increments of ten percent, and later up
to twenty percent.244
Automatic adjustment mechanisms for feed-in tariff rates have been
adopted in other jurisdictions as well.245 With their reliance on actual
deployment data, these mechanisms are superior to the previously
prevailing practice of randomly set annual degression rates.246
Prediction markets, however, could dramatically improve upon
automatic adjustment mechanisms.
From a timing perspective, automatic adjustments inevitably trail
actual market developments because they react to previously observed
deployment levels. Add to that the time it takes for the automatic price
adjustment to become effective and it is easy to understand why
automatically adjusted feed-in tariff rates are likely to lag behind
actual cost characteristics, especially in markets as dynamic as those
for solar and other emerging low-carbon energy technologies.
Oregon’s feed-in tariff has been criticized for this very reason, as it
provides for automatic adjustments only every six months.247 In
contrast, prediction markets could aggregate information from
knowledgeable parties into a well-informed forecast of what the
levelized cost of solar electricity from a specific kind of project will be
when the next enrollment window opens.
Automatic adjustment mechanisms also tend to lack necessary
nuance when it comes to the magnitude of adjustments. Oregon’s
feed-in tariff program, for example, originally assumed that
adjustments in increments of ten percent would be sufficient to track
market developments.248 At times of tumbling panel prices, however,
downward adjustments of ten percent every six months may not be
sufficient to keep up with steep declines in solar hardware costs.
Subsequent program amendments allowed for automatic rate
reductions of up to twenty percent. Such large increments, however,
pose the inverse risk of excessive rate reductions. Sure enough,
Oregon’s mechanism eventually overdid its automatic rate reductions,
as evidenced by the need to raise the feed-in tariff rate in April of 2012
244

Id. at 7-8.
See, e.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2013 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT 59-60
(2013); Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L.
REV. 937, 955 (2014) (referencing Germany’s “breathing cap”).
246 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
247 See, e.g., Pub. Util. Comm’n of Or., Solar Voltaic Comments and Regulations,
UM 1505 (2011) (statement of Dave Sullivan) (“This just isn’t enough to keep up with
the dynamic changes occurring in the marketplace.”).
248 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
245
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following low deployment after an excessive twenty-percent reduction
six months prior. Policymakers could avoid problems like those
encountered by Oregon if they tied tariff rates to prediction market
forecasts. In dynamic market environments, prediction markets are
better suited to determine the direction and magnitude of rate
adjustments than are clumsy automatic rate adjustment mechanisms.
B. Renewable Portfolio Standards: How Many Renewables Can the Grid
Absorb?
Renewable portfolio standards create demand for solar, wind, and
other low-carbon renewables by requiring electric utility companies to
source a percentage of the electricity they sell to end-users from
renewable sources.249 Utilities prove their compliance with these
requirements through “renewable energy credits.”250 Power plant
operators normally receive one such credit for every megawatt-hour of
electricity generated from renewable resources.251 Non-utility power
generators can sell their renewable energy credits to utilities in order
to receive a premium on top of their income from power sales in the
wholesale electricity market. Utilities can also invest in their own
renewable power generation facilities to earn renewable energy credits
for the electricity they produce. Whether utilities choose to earn their
own credits or purchase them from others, they eventually pass the
associated costs on to their ratepayers.252
Unlike feed-in tariffs that require regulators to set rates for eligible
technologies, renewable portfolio standards trust the market’s invisible
hand to determine trading prices for renewable energy credits and,
hence, a generator’s overall revenue. While the market price is a
function of demand and supply, policymakers indirectly affect it
through the share of the electricity market they require utilities to
serve with renewables. Requirements vary widely across states, from
Ohio’s modest 12.5% by 2026 mandate to fifty percent by 2030 in
249 See Reinhard Haas et al., A Historical Review of Promotion Strategies for
Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources in EU Countries, 15 RENEWABLE &
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 1003, 1011-12 (2011).
250 MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 214, at 155; Hass et al., supra note 249, at 1012.
Internationally, renewable energy credits are also referred to as tradable green
certificates or renewable energy guarantees of origin.
251 Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 1339, 1378 (2010) (reporting that some states award renewable energy credits
for every kilowatt hour of renewable electricity generation).
252 See Joshua P. Fershee, Moving Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking
Energy Policy Based on a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 1410-12 (2010).
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California and New York and all the way to a 100% renewable fueled
electricity market in Hawaii by 2045.253 These numbers are the
product of a wide range of inputs, including political forces, resource
availability and quality, ratepayer advocacy, and utility interests,
among others.
From a practical perspective, one of the most important questions
for policymakers to resolve is how ramping up the share of solar,
wind, and other weather-dependent renewables will affect the
reliability of electric service. Critics of the large-scale build-out of solar
and wind power often claim that the intermittent output profiles of
these renewable resources will jeopardize the stability of the electrical
grid. According to one commentator, for example, “[w]hen
renewables supply 20 to 30 percent of all electricity, many utilityenergy engineers predict, the system will no longer be able to balance
supply and demand.”254 Empirical evidence from across the globe
suggests, however, that the grid can likely absorb larger quantities of
intermittent renewables. Germany, for example, tripled the share of
solar and wind power in its electricity mix between 2006 and 2013 to
twenty-six percent, “while managing to reduce average annual outage
times.”255
But is there a limit? And, if so, how high is it? The answer to this
critical question will depend on numerous factors and is likely to vary
across jurisdictions and, more importantly, electricity networks. With
information on grid infrastructure, load profiles, and other crucial
factors widely dispersed, prediction markets are well suited to help
policymakers gain a better understanding of “their” grid’s ability to
accommodate a growing share of renewables with intermittent output
characteristics. Prediction markets could, for example, forecast outage
times conditioned on the required percentage of renewables in the
energy mix.
C. Net Metering: What Are the Costs and Benefits of Distributed
Generation?
Adopted by over forty states, net energy metering has become the
primary mechanism for tracking and rewarding distributed renewable
253

NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. & DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 209.
Charles C. Mann, What If We Never Run out of Oil?, ATLANTIC (May 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/05/what-if-we-never-run-out-ofoil/309294/?single_page=true.
255 Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 234, at 87 (emphasis
omitted).
254
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energy generation in the United States.256 Notwithstanding some
variation across programs, net energy metering generally allows an
electric utility’s customer to run her meter forward while consuming
power from the grid and backward while feeding power, e.g., from
solar panels on her rooftop, into the grid.257 At the end of the billing
period, the utility charges the customer for the amount of power
consumed from the grid minus power generated onsite and fed into
the grid.258 So long as the customer generator, on balance, consumes
more electricity from the grid than she feeds in, her locally generated
power is effectively remunerated at the retail electricity rate, several
times higher than what she could get on the wholesale power
market.259
In recent years, net metering programs have come under attack by
special interest groups.260 Led by electric utilities, opponents argue
that net metering enables wealthy homeowners with rooftop solar to
effectively stop paying for vital network maintenance and upgrades
despite using the grid to supply electricity to their homes when their
solar panels do not produce enough energy to meet their demand.261
Already, some states have introduced hefty grid usage fees for
electricity customers with solar rooftop installations.262 There is no
256 See Revesz & Unel, supra note 207, at 47; see also RENEWABLE ENERGY POL’Y
NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, RENEWABLES 2017 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 120, 123-24
(2017) (documenting the proliferation of net energy metering globally and in the
United States).
257 See EDISON ELEC. INST., SOLAR ENERGY AND NET METERING 1, 2 (2013),
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/generation/NetMetering/Documents/Straight%20T
alk%20About%20Net%20Metering.pdf; Revesz & Unel, supra note 207, at 46.
258 See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Solving the Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle
Surrounding State “Sustainable” Energy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 128-29
(2014).
259 See NAÏM R. DARGHOUTH ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., NET METERING
AND MARKET FEEDBACK LOOPS: EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF RETAIL RATE DESIGN ON
DISTRIBUTED PV DEPLOYMENT 1-3 (2015), http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl183185_0.pdf.
260 See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, Solar Panel Payments Set Off a Fairness Debate, N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/05/business/solar-paymentsset-off-a-fairness-debate.html; Hiroko Tabuchi, Rooftop Solar Dims Under Pressure from
Utility Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/
climate/rooftop-solar-panels-tax-credits-utility-companies-lobbying.html.
261 For a thoughtful summary and critique of the fairness arguments leveled against
net energy metering programs, see Rule, supra note 213.
262 See, e.g., Katie Fehrenbacher, Nevada’s New Solar Fees Have People Furious,
FORTUNE (Jan. 14, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/01/14/nevada-solar-battleground/.
Other states are looking to follow Nevada’s example. See, e.g., Mark Hand, Utah Utility
Wants to Triple Monthly Charges for Solar Customers, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 8, 2017,
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doubt that net energy metering and other clean energy policies have
important equity implications.263 Even for a cause as worthy as climate
change mitigation, well-to-do homeowners should not be free riding
on the electric grid at the expense of lower-income households. Yet,
the common practice of embedding grid usage fees in volumetric
charges, when coupled with net metering, allows solar customers to
significantly reduce, if not altogether eliminate, their contributions to
grid maintenance and upgrades.
Some usage fee might, therefore, seem reasonable to prevent
inequitable cross-subsidization from lower-income to higher-income
ratepayers. But how high should such a fee be? To answer this
question, regulators first need to determine how much of a crosssubsidy, if any, solar customers actually receive from non-solar
customers. This seemingly simple exercise in basic arithmetic is
complicated by the fact that solar and non-solar ratepayers alike
benefit from net metering-funded solar installations. There is, in fact,
evidence to suggest that solar ratepayers may provide a net benefit to
the grid and, hence, be the ones who cross-subsidize their non-solar
counterparts.264 For example, rooftop solar and other low-carbon
distributed energy resources not only help mitigate climate change but
also reduce peak demand during the hottest hours of the day.
California’s net metering program, along with other incentives, has
shaved thousands of megawatts off the state’s peak demand load.265
Peak shaving provides two key benefits to the grid. First, reductions in
peak demand minimize, if not altogether eliminate, the need for socalled peaker plants — usually older, more polluting plants that can
be dispatched at relatively short notice but have such high operating
costs that they are not profitable other than at peak demand, when

4:37 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/new-fees-on-utah-solar-customers-e4c7c2507008/.
263 For a comparison of the equity implications across policies, see Felix Mormann,
Clean Energy Equity, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3295296.
264 See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade in Electric Power, 2018
UTAH L. REV. 49, 59-62 (2018) (describing the benefits that distributed energy
resources offer to the electric grid).
265 Cf. CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, WHAT THE DUCK CURVE TELLS US ABOUT
MANAGING A GREEN GRID 1, 3 (2016), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/
FlexibleResourcesHelpRenewables_FastFacts.pdf. For evidence of similar peakshaving benefits from distributed solar generation in Hawaii, see Jeff, The California
Duck Curve is Real and Bigger Than Expected, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-california-duck-curve-is-real-andbigger-than-expected#gs.2OnI32U.
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wholesale prices are highest.266 As a result, peak shaving abates
pollution and reduces wholesale prices to the benefit of all ratepayers.
Second, peak shaving reduces the need for costly transmission
maintenance and upgrades required to deliver electricity from often
remotely sited power plants to load centers. Pioneering utilities are
already embracing distributed generation as an opportunity to avoid
investments in distribution infrastructure by calling upon the
marketplace to supply alternatives to wire upgrades and expansions.267
Quantifying these and other benefits provided by net meteringfunded distributed generation and determining the exact costs
imposed on the grid has proven difficult.268 In light of the plethora of
inputs relevant to this calculus and the wide dispersion of relevant
information, prediction markets offer an ideal methodology for
demystifying the net value of rooftop solar and other distributed
energy resources now and going forward. Amidst a heated debate with
strong opinions but limited facts on both sides, prediction market
forecasts could help state policymakers determine the appropriate
level of solar usage fees, if any, to impose on solar electricity
customers in their state. Prediction markets could, for example,
forecast the capital needs for generation and transmission expansion
conditioned on the implementation of a net metering program to
promote solar and other low-carbon distributed generation. To
provide a meaningful counterfactual, a second market could sell
contracts for generation and transmission investment requirements for
a baseline scenario without net metering.

266 See PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER:
THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 96 (2010).
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267 See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations: Market Pathways
and Challenges in the Modern Electric Grid, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351, 422-23 (2017)
(discussing one example, the “Neighborhood Program,” in which the New York utility
Consolidated Edison is using distributed energy resources and other “non-wires”
alternatives to avoid having to build new distribution system infrastructure).
268 See, e.g., Dan Haugen, Minnesota Becomes First State to Set “Value of Solar” Tariff,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/
minnesota-becomes- St. John first-state-to-set-value-of-solar-tariff#gs.IVyL8e4. For a more
general discussion of value-of-solar tariffs, see generally MIKE TAYLOR ET AL., NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TP-6A20-62361, VALUE OF SOLAR: PROGRAM DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS (2015).
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D. The Trillion Dollar Question: Which Policies and Technologies Best
Reduce Greenhouse Gases?
Policymakers across the globe have embraced climate change
mitigation and adaptation as top priorities.269 Now that the question
whether to take action on climate change has been answered with a
resounding “yes,” the challenge of figuring out how to do so looms
large. The stakes could hardly be higher. In the continental United
States alone, millions are projected to be at risk from rising sea
levels.270 Annual adaptation costs are estimated at over $400 billion
with the overall cost of relocation expected to exceed $14 trillion.271
Over the next two decades, the worldwide capital needs of clean
energy and energy efficiency projects are forecast to surpass $30
trillion.272 Which public policy strategy is best suited to leverage such
vast amounts of private-sector investment? And what technologies
should be targeted as the most promising to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions in time to limit global warming to the crucial 2-degree
Celsius mark,273 or the recently announced, even more ambitious goal
of 1.5 degrees Celsius?274
The quest for the optimal policy strategy to combat climate change
is in high gear. As of 2016, 126 countries had adopted one or more

269 To date, 180 of the 197 parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change have ratified the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Paris
Agreement: Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/
paris_agreement/items/9444.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2018). Even the Trump
administration appears to have abandoned its original plans to withdraw the United States
from the Paris Agreement. See Emre Peker, Trump Administration Seeks to Avoid
Withdrawal from Paris Climate Accord, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/trump-administration-wont-withdraw-from-paris-climate-deal-1505593922.
270 Mathew E. Hauer et al., Millions Projected to Be at Risk from Sea-Level Rise in the
Continental United States, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 691, 691 (2016).
271 Id. at 693-94. For a more conservative estimate, see Robert J. Nicholls et al.,
Sea-Level Rise and Its Possible Impacts Given a “Beyond 4ºC World” in the Twenty-First
Century, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 1, 13 (2011) (pegging annual adaptation
costs at $25-270 billion).
272 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016, at 22 (2016).
273 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS v (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the
importance of limiting global warming to no more than two degrees Celsius in order
to avoid disastrous and irreparable damage to the global ecosystem). See generally
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 226,
at 6-26 (discussing the opportunities and challenges associated with the ramp-up of
low-carbon, renewable energy technologies).
274 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5
DEGREES: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 6 (Valérie Masson-Delmotteet al. eds., 2018).
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policies to promote renewable power generation, sixty-eight nations
had implemented policies to decarbonize their transportation sectors,
and twenty-one countries had heating and cooling policies in place.275
Most policymakers appear to be following a trial-and-error approach,
switching back and forth among different policies.276 Many, such as
Australia, France, and Japan, have adopted a multi-pronged approach
combining two or more different policy measures.277 The same trend
can be observed among state policymakers in the United States with
California, for example, mixing and matching no fewer than five
different policy tools to promote low-carbon renewables.278
Two decades of national and international experimentation with
climate and clean energy policy have produced two key insights. First,
not all clean energy policies are created equal.279 Second, there is no
one-size-fits-all policy option. Instead, a policy’s success depends on a
wide range of location-specific factors, including energy market
regulations, lending practices, permitting rules, taxation, and
manufacturing, to name but a few.280 With knowledge of this
multitude of diverse and ever-changing factors widely dispersed across
regulators, investors, and other stakeholders, prediction markets could
serve as a valuable focal point for aggregating and weighing pertinent
information to assess a policy’s likelihood to succeed in a given
jurisdiction.
The choice of policy should further be tailored to the suite of
technologies a policymaker seeks to promote. All else being equal,
renewable portfolio standards and other market-based policies tend to
yield better results for more mature technologies, while emerging
technologies fare better under a feed-in tariff or similar policy
approach that does not add market risk to technology risk.281 Effective
275 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, RENEWABLE ENERGY POL’Y
NETWORK, supra note 256, at 120.
276 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES, supra note 212, at 94-95;
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES: BEST AND FUTURE POLICY PRACTICE 14748 (2011) [hereinafter RENEWABLES].
277 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLES, supra note 276.
278 See Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 234, at 77-80, 83.
279 See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLES, supra note 276, at 130 (“Support
policies for renewables work, but they do not all work equally well.”).
280 See Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner, More
Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303, 320 (2014) (“Renewable energy
markets, however, vary considerably at national, regional, and even local levels
regarding, for example, the ease of project development, resource endowment, cost of
capital, and other critical market conditions.”).
281 See Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 234, at 90-92.
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climate policymaking, therefore, starts with identifying the
technologies that promise the greatest reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions. Even the most thoughtful policy strategy will only be as
successful at mitigating climate change as the technologies it seeks to
promote. The range of technologies is vast. Nuclear, solar, and wind
power may be the most obvious low-carbon power generation options
today, but ocean tidal, advanced geothermal, and other emerging
technologies hold great promise for the future.282 Moving beyond
generation, advanced batteries, molten salt, flywheel, compressed air,
and other storage technologies could go a long way toward
decarbonizing the grid. Smart thermostats, building weatherization,
and other energy efficiency technologies, meanwhile, could reduce the
need for new generation infrastructure and accelerate the
decommissioning of coal-fired and other high-carbon legacy
generators.283 No policymaker can be expected to maintain a working
knowledge of these and other, constantly evolving technology options,
nor should they have to rely solely on advice from a small group of
possibly biased experts. Prediction markets could help policymakers
answer the trillion-dollar question of which technologies, and policies,
will deliver the greatest greenhouse gas emission reductions for their
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Global warming and sea level rise represent enormous challenges for
our planet and for policymakers. Efforts to address our changing
climate require difficult predictions, including high-stakes bets on
which technologies will usher in the low-carbon future. Existing legal
institutions and conventional decision-making methods are too flawed
to be trusted with this Herculean task. With a strong track record of
outperforming other forecasting mechanisms across a wide range of
contexts, prediction markets could help resolve the current policy
gridlock and foster a new generation of smarter climate policies. In
particular, prediction markets can improve government decision
making through more reliable and transparent forecasts that aggregate
282 For an overview of these and other generation technologies, see generally DAVID
J.C. MACKAY, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY: WITHOUT THE HOT AIR (2009).
283 See, e.g., Steven Chu, Cleaning Up: Energy and Climate Bill Will Boost the
Economy, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH (July 22, 2009), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/
article_e5d2835d-c68e-5249-8cc4-7af214751182.html (“The quickest and easiest way
to reduce our carbon emissions is to make our appliances, cars, homes and other
buildings more efficient. In fact, energy efficiency is not just low-hanging fruit; it is
fruit that is lying on the ground.”).
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widely dispersed information in an unbiased way untainted by interest
group politics. They also have the potential to overcome resistance to
climate change mitigation efforts, especially among market-oriented
conservatives.
We have outlined only a few of the many opportunities for federal
and state policymakers to incorporate prediction markets into the
climate policy process. Some of our suggestions could be implemented
immediately with no change in existing laws, while other, more
radical proposals would require legislative action. The applications
discussed in this Article are by no means exhaustive. In fact, our main
goal is to alert policymakers to the near-infinite possibilities for
prediction markets and to encourage widespread experimentation.
Prediction markets are an incredibly promising policy tool, but their
potential will be realized only if policymakers are willing to use them.
We recommend starting small, perhaps with a play-money market at
ARPA-E. Smaller-scale experimentation can create an empirical track
record that facilitates incremental improvements to prediction market
design and implementation. As prediction markets gain acceptance in
the climate policy world, policymakers can expand their reach,
possibly even delegating certain decisions to the markets themselves.

